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Article Reviews U.S., USSR Nuclear Proposals

HK0512014491 Beijing SHIJIE ZHISHI in Chinese
No 21, 1 Nov 91 pp 12-13

[Article by Li Qinggong (2621 1987 0501): "Same Tune But Different Intentions—United States, Soviet Union Put Forth New Nuclear Disarmament Proposals"—first paragraph is SHIJIE ZHISHI introduction]

[Text] The United States and the Soviet Union for the first time have proposed unilateral nuclear disarmament plans without any conditions attached nor requiring nuclear inspection. This is evidence of a new turn in U.S.-Soviet relations. Behind this tacit agreement, however, their intentions still differ.

On 27 September, U.S. President Bush put forward a five-point proposal for U.S. unilateral nuclear disarmament. On 5 October, Soviet President Gorbachev gave a positive response by announcing a seven-point proposal, not only accepting the U.S. proposal without any reservation, but suggesting bilateral negotiation on further nuclear disarmament. The United States' unconditional unilateral move was a pleasant surprise to all countries concerned, which named it an "epoch-making and inspiring initiative" and the "herald of a new era in international relations." That the Soviet Union accepted the U.S. suggestion so rapidly and completely was also believed to "put an end to the era of strategic arms equilibrium."

Things are different, and the new round of U.S. and Soviet disarmament proposals have thus shown some meaningful and thought-provoking new features and new influence.

Soviet Union Sings United States' Tune

First, in the previous races of proposals for nuclear disarmament between the United States and the Soviet Union, it often happened that the Soviet Union took the offensive and presented a proposal, forcing the United States to take a defensive posture in response. But this time, the United States came out with a proposal first and the Soviet Union was forced to react to it.

Second, most of the past U.S. and Soviet nuclear disarmament proposals demanded that both sides reduce nuclear weapons together and asked the other side to reduce even more. Very seldom was a unilateral nuclear disarmament proposal advanced. This time, however, the United States offered its unilateral nuclear disarmament plan and merely asked the Soviet Union to take corresponding action, without setting it as a precondition.

Third, in the past U.S. and Soviet nuclear disarmament proposals, the positions held by the two sides were basically in conflict with one another. This time, however, they both adopted a relatively cooperative attitude. After Bush put forth the five-point nuclear disarmament

proposal, Gorbachev virtually accepted the whole proposal in his own seven-point nuclear disarmament proposal.

Fourth, the past U.S. and Soviet disarmament proposals normally focused on the issue of disarmament in a single category. Even in a proposal which included several projects, the projects tended to be linked and served as preconditions for one another. The two sides' most recent proposals, however, involve not only the further reduction of strategic nuclear weapons, but also the major reduction of short-range nuclear weapons; and the reduction of not only land-based nuclear weapons but also sea-based and air-based ones. The two sides also expressed their willingness to hold dialogue and cooperate in such areas as planning for the modernization of nuclear weapons, dealing with nuclear nonproliferation, guaranteeing the safety of nuclear weapons, establishing a joint early warning system, improving the command and control of nuclear weapons, and developing nonnuclear antimissile defense systems. All this has in fact made it an "all-inclusive nuclear disarmament proposal."

Fifth, in the past nuclear disarmament proposals, the negotiation program was fixed before the measures for nuclear investigation were discussed and finalized, often throwing the issue into a state of limbo. This time, however, there was no demand for negotiation nor was nuclear investigation stipulated. Only a concrete disarmament plan was proposed. This was the first case of reaching agreement on nuclear disarmament without negotiation in the history of nuclear disarmament, and its speed was also unprecedented.

In their new nuclear disarmament proposals, the common ground between the United States and the Soviet Union is obviously greater than their differences. They have reached a common understanding on the destruction of all land-based tactical nuclear weapons, the dismantling and partial destruction of sea-based tactical nuclear weapons, the abolition of the plan for developing airborne short-range nuclear missiles, the termination of the standby state of strategic bombers and some intercontinental ballistic missiles, and the suspension of the plan for deploying mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles. On the basis of this, they will join hands in implementing certain measures.

Despite all the agreement, the two sides still differed on this issue: The United States asked the Soviet Union to destroy all the nuclear heads on its air defense missiles, whereas the latter only agreed to destroy some; the former proposed partially destroying sea-based tactical nuclear weapons, whereas the latter demanded total destruction; the latter proposed dismantling and sealing up airborne nuclear weapons, whereas the former made no mention of this at all; Bush made an appeal that the United States and the Soviet Union reach an agreement on the total elimination of land-based multihead missiles at an early date, whereas the Soviet Union suggested the two sides hold talks on further reduction of nuclear

weapons by 50 percent as soon as possible. Interestingly enough, the common points in the two sides' proposals transcended and temporarily covered up these differences.

Same Tune, But Different Themes

Generally speaking, the Bush and Gorbachev's suggestions seem to strike the same note, i.e., making major cuts in nuclear weapons in various categories at high speed. But one can easily see from the international and domestic circumstances which are enveloping the United States and the Soviet Union that the melody they both are playing contains different strategic interests. It can be said that the military significance of Bush's proposal is greater than its political significance, while Gorbachev's proposal shows more consideration for political and economic interests.

The United States put forth its proposal on the basis of its understanding of the following aspects. First, it believes that the dramatic change in the Soviet Union has offered an opportunity to speed up the process of nuclear disarmament and that, especially when the Soviet Union needs help from the West, it will respond positively to all nuclear disarmament proposals put forward by the United States. Second, it worries that, after the political situation in the Soviet Union changes, the central Union authorities will have much weaker control over the nuclear weapons deployed in the republics, which in turn may lead to the loss of control over—and proliferation of—nuclear weapons and may pose a renewed nuclear threat. Bush's purpose in stressing the need to destroy short-range nuclear weapons is to force the Soviet Union to adopt vigorous measures to prevent this type of nuclear weapon from falling into the hands of the republics as a result of the disintegration of the Union. Third, it put forth the proposal for unilateral nuclear disarmament to force the Soviet Union to react positively and start reciprocal reduction of nuclear weapons and further reduce the threat to the United States and Western countries posed by the Soviet Union's remaining massive store of nuclear weapons to prevent nuclear confrontation from returning to the original degree once changes take place in the Soviet Union to the disadvantage of the United States. Fourth, it recognizes that the tactical nuclear weapons it deployed in the various regions of Europe and Asia have basically lost their function because the confrontation between the two major military blocs in the East and West diminished and the chance of nuclear war greatly reduced. Eliminating these tactical nuclear weapons will not only force the Soviet Union to follow suit, but also will significantly free the West European Union countries from nuclear terror and will save military expenditures by doing away with those outmoded nuclear weapons from the 1950's and 1960's. This would generate extra money for developing new weapons. Fifth, the presidential election is coming next year, and Bush needs to establish his image and increase his political capital in the election campaign through his handling of the nuclear disarmament.

The Soviet Union, on the other hand, had four points in view when advancing its nuclear disarmament proposal. First, after the situation in the Soviet Union went through a drastic change, the status of Gorbachev was seriously challenged. The nuclear disarmament proposal put forth by Bush came in time to help Gorbachev reap some diplomatic fruits and make up for his losses in the domestic political struggle. Second, the Soviet Union is in serious economic difficulty and urgently needs aid from the West. The armament cuts can serve to please the West even further and eliminate their worries about its military strength, especially its nuclear power. In the meantime, the Soviet Union can also cut its military expenditures. Third, Gorbachev himself also worries that the loss of control over nuclear weapons and their proliferation in the republics will add to the chance that the republics will resort to nuclear weapons in times of crisis, and new conflicts and even hostile sentiments may be spawned among various republics due to the problems with the control of nuclear weapons. Fourth, the Soviet Union put forth a counter-proposal which went a step further than the United States' proposal. Part of the intention is to check the latter's development of nuclear armaments and deter the process of widening the gap between the United States and the Soviet Union in nuclear strength. The points raised by the Soviet Union, such as both countries reducing another 50 percent of their strategic nuclear weapons, banning nuclear tests totally, and dismantling air-based nuclear weapons, are meant to abort the U.S. plan for the deployment of B-2 stealth bombers, wipe out the foundation for developing new generations of nuclear weapons by the United States, and keep in check the development of the United States' strategic defense planning.

Profound, Far-Reaching Influence

In recent years, the momentum of U.S.-Soviet disarmament has gradually strengthened, and the process of disarmament has quickened. This has not only led to the conclusion of the medium-range missile treaty and European conventional disarmament treaty, but eventually brought about the treaty on the reduction of strategic weapons. Before the approving and implementing the treaty on the reduction of strategic weapons, the United States and the Soviet Union have put forth new proposals for nuclear disarmament, signalling the acceleration of the U.S.-Soviet nuclear disarmament process. This will speed up the disarmament process in other areas as well. Predictably, the momentum of U.S.-Soviet disarmament will continue in the future, the process may take less time, the scope may expand, and the procedure may be simplified. Even more noteworthy is that, with the development of U.S.-Soviet disarmament, international disarmament will more quickly evolve from bilateral operation to multilateral operation, from the United States and the Soviet Union to the whole world, and from Europe to other regions.

As the East-West cold war has ended, the United States has begun considering the revision of its nuclear strategy. Bush's new proposal, in fact, contains two interacting

aspects: Reduction of nuclear armaments and adjustment of nuclear strategy. The rate, speed, and depth of nuclear disarmament determine the direction, objective, and approach of the adjustment of nuclear strategy. The media believes that the direction of the United States' nuclear strategy adjustment: The chief target of nuclear attack will shift from the Soviet Union to the Third World countries which possess nuclear, biological, and chemical strength for military purposes; planning for nuclear war will be switched from preparation for a nuclear war in Europe to that for nuclear conflicts in the Third World; the target of nuclear deterrence will move from the Soviet Union to the hot-spot regions; the development of nuclear strength will be switched from the "three-in-one" modernization of nuclear strength to the establishment of a nuclear strength system with both offensive and defensive capacity; the nuclear combat readiness will shift from high-intensity preparedness for offensive combat to low-intensity preparedness for defensive combat.

Similar adjustment is being made to the nuclear strategy of the Soviet Union. But because it is busy with the political, economic, and ethnic problems at home, the pace of nuclear strategy adjustment currently is quite slow.

To sum up, the proposal and counter-proposal put forward by Bush and Gorbachev on nuclear disarmament mark the beginning of a new stage in the U.S.-Soviet disarmament process. This undoubtedly dovetails with the evolution of their relations from confrontation to dialogue, coordination, and cooperation. It is worth pointing out that the dramatic change in the Soviet Union has been a catalyst in this process.

UN Passes Australia-New Zealand Test Ban

*OW1012120191 Beijing XINHUA in English
1140 GMT 10 Dec 91*

[Text] Canberra, December 10 (XINHUA)—A resolution co-sponsored by Australia and New Zealand calling for a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty has won overwhelming support at the 46th United Nations General Assembly (UNGA).

The joint resolution on December 6 attracted a record vote at the plenary session of the General Assembly with 147 yes, 2 no and 4 abstentions.

Australia and New Zealand have been presenting this resolution annually at UNGA and, in previous years, have had to contend with a competing resolution sponsored by Mexico. Australian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans said in a statement released here today.

This year saw a major achievement with the presentation of a merged text with Mexico.

Evans said that the voting reflected wide support in the international community for the principled and pragmatic approach taken in the resolution.

Spokesman Voices 'Concern' Over Soviet Weapons

*HK1312013791 Beijing CHINA DAILY in English
13 Dec 91 p 1*

[By Zhang Ping: "Concern Over Soviet Nuclear Arms Control"]

[Text] China yesterday joined with other major countries in expressing concern over the control of the Soviet nuclear arsenal in the wake of recent political developments in the Soviet Union.

Foreign Ministry spokesman Duan Jin said at a weekly news briefing that China had taken note of the international concern and hoped that the Soviet Union would properly handle their nuclear weapons.

Duan said that as a neighbouring country, China is following closely the development of the situation in the Soviet Union and hopes that all relevant parties would stabilize the situation soon through consultations.

He said that China and the Soviet Union, as well as the Soviet republics, should continue to develop good-neighbourly relations on the basis of the two Sino-Soviet joint communiques.

He reiterated that the consistent stand of the Chinese Government is that China never interferes in the internal affairs of other countries and respects the choice of the people of each country.

China will continue to develop good-neighbourly relations with Russia, Byelorussia and Ukraine, and other Soviet republics, on the basis of the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-Existence, he said.

And at present, China has channels of contacts with the Soviet republics, including Russia, Belarus and Ukraine and has not encountered any problems with them.

The Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman also told reporters that at present, the border region between China and the Soviet Union enjoyed stable conditions.

XINHUA 'Roundup' Discusses Global Arms Cuts

*OW1612141891 Beijing XINHUA Domestic Service
in Chinese 0414 GMT 16 Dec 91*

["Roundup" by reporter Yang Yuehua (2799 6460 5478): "Take a Look at Global Arms Reduction From the Perspective of Debates at the UN General Assembly—XINHUA headline"]

[Text] The United Nations, 15 December (XINHUA)—The arms reduction debates at the 46th UN General Assembly have already come to an end. The General Assembly passed a total of 40 resolutions on nuclear arms, biological and chemical weapons, reduction of conventional arms, transparency of international arms sales, among other topics. Every country urged the

military superpowers to assume their special responsibility for arms reduction as quickly as possible; the call for establishing a new international order that is not under the shadow of the superpowers' arms race was voiced even louder.

In recent years, military confrontation between the East and the West decreased, and the cold war—with the arms race between the United States and the USSR as its core—has been collapsing day by day. Meanwhile, upheavals in the international situation have become even more conspicuous; the economic gap between poor and rich nations has further widened; contradictions between the South and North have intensified; and contradictions between different races, nations, and religious beliefs have exacerbated. International security and peace still face grim challenges. The United States has proposed a "new international order," with the United States playing a leading role. The proposal caused several medium and small countries to be on guard. They maintained that a new international order should ensure the security of every member of the international community; that no superpower should be permitted to bully small and weak nations at will; and that all nations must take a more active part in arms reduction in order to establish a new international order which is just and reasonable, and in which peace and stability prevail, thus bringing about true world peace.

After the end of World War II, the superpowers and their allies were engaged in an arms race for nearly 50 years and accumulated an arsenal of nuclear and conventional weapons which are sufficient to destroy mankind several times over. Now, in the wake of changes in the international political climate, more and more countries in the world have been calling for large-scale arms reduction. Undoubtedly the call is conducive to the progress of arms reduction, but there are still a great number of problems on the table regarding the arms reduction talks. Because the actions of certain superpowers are not in keeping with their promises for a number of crucial issues on arms reduction, it is very hard to predict good progress for the world in the area of arms reduction in the near future.

During their debates at the present session of the UN General Assembly, a good number of representatives pointed out that the most fundamental step for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons is putting an end to all nuclear tests once and for all. They strongly asked the international community to take all necessary measures for concluding a treaty on complete prohibition of nuclear testing as quickly as possible.

At present, however, certain nuclear superpowers still refuse to stop their nuclear tests. They refuse to admit that a ban on underground nuclear tests is an important measure for perfecting treaties partially banning nuclear testing. This year, the United States—the world's number one nuclear superpower—made a statement that nuclear deterrence is still the "basis" for the collective defense of itself and its allies. At a debate in the UN

General Assembly, the U.S. representative also expressed that "only when the United States and its allies no longer need to depend on nuclear deterrence for protection of international security and stability" will the United States agree to sign a treaty completely prohibiting nuclear testing.

At present, the representatives of many countries maintain that, as long as the nuclear superpowers refuse to assume their special responsibility for nuclear arms reduction, a complete ban on nuclear testing is nothing but a fantasy conjured up by the international community's own wishful thinking.

Another relatively important step the present session of the UN General Assembly took on arms reduction was its decision—for the first time—to work for concluding a convention on banning chemical weapons in 1992. This year the talks on the convention have already made progress and are now entering a crucial phase, though there are still some important problems awaiting solution. One of them is the extremely sensitive issue of inspection. Many countries are worried that, if the issue is not properly handled, it will be hard to avoid, resulting in interference with the normal development of a country's chemical industry for civil use while inspections of activities in violation of the international convention are being conducted. During talks regarding the convention, developing countries requested protection of their national right to promote development of their own chemical industry while fulfilling their obligations and promises stipulated in the convention.

The issue of transparency of armaments was another important item on the agenda for debate at the present session of the UN General Assembly. The UN Secretary General suggested establishing a system under the auspices of the United Nations for registering arms transfers which would apply to every member of the international community without discrimination. Twelve nations in Western Europe and Japan jointly made a proposal on "transparency of armaments," maintaining that transparency and openness could prevent accumulation of conventional weapons that "disrupt stability." Therefore, establishing such a system for registering arms transfers will be conducive to multilateral arms control and the efforts to accelerate arms reduction.

Some medium and small-sized countries maintained that the system for registering arms transfer and transparency of arms sales will help eliminate doubts and fears and will prevent some countries from possessing more weapons than are needed for self-defense. They were worried, however, that, while some countries that import weapons for self-defense make public the types, models, quality, and quantity of their weapons, other countries are permitted to mass produce, renew, and equip themselves with all kinds of weapons in secret. These concerned countries pointed out that it would be absolutely unfair and discriminatory if such a situation were to occur. In his speech, the Cuban representative condemned certain countries for dumping arms and transferring arms production know-how abroad, wasting

large amounts of resources and causing deaths and injuries to a large number of people; violating the sovereignty and territorial integrity of other countries; stirring up enmity between countries; and causing mutual slaughter while at the same time volunteering to be a "vanguard" for implementation of the system for registering arms transfers.

Therefore, during discussion of the issue of transparency, representatives at the UN General Assembly had

to define the armament needed by every country for defending the security of its territory, and furthermore include the issues of arms production and storage, transfer of arms together along with their technologies, and so forth. In short, if the international community wants to really give due play to the role of transparency of armaments, it must ensure that the system applies to every member, is not discriminatory, and respects the principle of voluntary participation by every country.

JAPAN

UN Vote on Conventional Arms Registry Welcomed

OW1012000291 Tokyo KYODO in English 2336 GMT 9 Dec 91

[Text] Tokyo, Dec. 10 KYODO—Japanese Foreign Minister Michio Watanabe welcomed Tuesday as “unprecedented” an overwhelming vote by the United Nations General Assembly to establish a registry of global conventional arms transactions.

He said in a statement the registry of annual data on shipments of missiles, battle tanks, combat aircraft, warships, and other major conventional weapons would heighten the international community's awareness of the spread and transfer of weapons.

Watanabe renewed Japan's pledge to play a leadership role in the campaign against the spread of weapons.

Cosponsored by Japan, Western Europe, and other countries, the nonbinding resolution passed the General Assembly 150-0 Monday. Only Cuba and Iraq abstained.

North Korea voted for the registry in the assembly after abstaining in a panel vote.

Watanabe said at a news conference after a cabinet meeting Tuesday that China's decision not to block the global arms registry by skipping the UN vote is “a step forward.”

He said Japan will continue to ask for Chinese cooperation in preventing the spread of weapons.

Defense Agency Director General Sohei Miyashita told reporters Japan will closely follow how countries with tactical nuclear weapons keep tabs on such weapons.

NORTH KOREA

U.S. Urged To Confirm Nuclear Arms Withdrawals

SK0612015791 Pyongyang Korean Central Broadcasting Network in Korean 0027 GMT 6 Dec 91

[NODONG SINMUN 6 December commentary: “The United States Should Show an Affirmative Reaction”]

[Text] News reports that the United States has begun withdrawing its nuclear weapons from South Korea are now in circulation, catching people's attention.

As a matter of course, we are paying attention to such reports. If we are to remove the nuclear threat from the Korean peninsula, its source must be eliminated and toward this end, it is imperative to withdraw the vast U.S. nuclear weapons deployed in South Korea before anything else.

This being the case, if the United States has really begun withdrawing its nuclear weapons from South Korea, it is good. However, reports from sources other than the owner of the nuclear weapons deployed in South Korea cannot be trusted.

The proprietor of the nuclear weapons deployed in South Korea is none other than the United States. Therefore, it is the U.S. Government's job to withdraw them.

Since it was the U.S. President himself that announced a U.S. plan to withdraw tactical nuclear weapons from South Korea, we rated it affirmatively as something worth welcoming.

In response, we put forward a new, forward-looking proposal that when the United States begins withdrawing its nuclear weapons from South Korea, we will sign the Nuclear Safeguards Accord.

This proposal, a very timely and realistic proposal in that it has clarified the fundamental ways of removing the nuclear threat from the Korean peninsula, has verified that we really are making earnest efforts to address the question.

So, no sooner had our proposal been announced than it began arousing affirmative reaction from the people of the world who value peace and justice.

This notwithstanding, the United States has not just failed to make clear its official stand on our proposal, but, as the one that is directly responsible, it also remained silent on the news report that the withdrawal of the nuclear weapons from South Korea had begun. This is hard to understand.

The United States should not have brought the nuclear weapons into South Korea in the first place. Now, since it deployed the nuclear weapons in South Korea, the United States should have, as a matter of course, responded to our demand that it withdraw its nuclear weapons and stop the nuclear threat against us when we made that call so that we could freely resolve the Nuclear Safeguards Accord issue.

In spite of this, to date, the United States has stubbornly persisted in its pretense that there were no nuclear weapons in South Korea and forced on us unilateral nuclear inspections, causing the delay in the settlement of the issue and making it complicated.

Now that it has admitted to the presence of nuclear weapons in South Korea and the need to withdraw them, the sooner the nuclear weapons are withdrawn, the better.

This means that we could sign the Nuclear Safeguards Accord that much sooner.

We are not fond of speaking empty words. When the news reports that the United States has begun withdrawing its nuclear weapons from South Korea are

confirmed, we will sign the Nuclear Safeguards Accord as we publicly promised early on.

The United States should show an affirmative reaction to our proposal at an early date.

The ball is already in the U.S. court.

Premier Urges Denuclearization in Talks With South

*SK1112052491 Pyongyang KCNA in English
0452 GMT 11 Dec 91*

[Text] Seoul December 11 (KCNA correspondent)—Head of the North side's delegation Yon Hyong-muk, premier of the Administration Council of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, at the fifth inter-Korean high-level talks open here urged the South side to accept the urgent proposal for denuclearisation put forward by us at the last fourth talks and our new draft agreement in which our side largely accepted the content of the draft agreement of the South side.

In his keynote speech at today's session the head of our side's delegation advanced "declaration on the denuclearisation on Korean peninsula" which had been put forward by us at the fourth talks held in Pyongyang in October and "agreement on reconciliation, nonaggression, and cooperation and exchange between the North and the South" (draft), a new concessional proposal in which the opinion of the South side was largely taken into consideration, and clarified our principled stand on this.

Comprehensively set out in our urgent proposal on denuclearisation are all the elements which can practically guarantee the denuclearisation, namely, the U.S. nuclear weapons which threaten our nation, deployed for action, be totally withdrawn and this be verified, the North and the South should not have nuclear weapons and should discharge the simultaneous nuclear inspection as required by the international treaty and prohibit the introduction of foreign nuclear weapons into the territory of our country and the nuclear-possessing nations should respect the status of the denuclearized Korean peninsula.

Yon Hyong-muk said:

The nuclear problem of our country owes its origin to the deployment of the U.S. nuclear weapons in South Korea and herein lies the basic content of the nuclear issue of our country.

The claim for "forcible inspection" while taking issue with the North's fictitious "nuclear development" is an undisguised interference in an independent sovereign state and an intolerable challenge to us.

If our fair proposal for the denuclearisation is realised, misgivings and distrust of each other will be dispelled smoothly with respect for each other, all the nuclear threat, realistic or potential, will be removed clearly and

the United States, a nuclear-possessing nation, and us, a non-nuclear state, will implement faithfully the obligations under the treaty.

Yon advanced "agreement on reconciliation, nonaggression, and cooperation and exchange between the North and the South" (draft) expressing our maximum magnanimity to the assertions of the South side.

It noted:

In accordance with the will of all the fellow countrymen who are desirous of the peaceful reunification of the divided country,

On the basis of the reaffirmation of the three principles of national reunification laid down in the July 4 joint statement,

The North and the South pledge themselves to remove the political and military confrontation for the promotion of national reconciliation and unity, for the prevention of encroachment and conflicts by armed forces, for the realisation of detente and for the maintenance of peace, to realize many-sided cooperation and exchange for the promotion of the common interests and prosperity of the nation, and to make concerted efforts to achieve peaceful reunification in recognition of the fact that the relationship between both sides is not the one between countries but a special one formed temporarily in the process of advancing towards reunification.

As regards this document, Yon Hyong-muk said:

We are willing to bring our opinion closer to yours on such discordant problems as those of expression in the text of the agreement, of the position and the order of arrangement of provisions in it and of its contents and all other problems. In particular, we are also ready to meet you halfway on such important matters at issue as those of converting the state of armistice into that of peace, of military confidence-building, of establishment of liaison offices, of opening to each other and exchange of newspapers, broadcasting, televisions and publications and realizing exchange in this field, of the correlations between the expected agreement and the existing treaties and agreements and of the installation of the joint commission as an organ executing the agreed items.

SOUTH KOREA

Seoul To Seek Seat at UN Disarmament Conference

*SK0712035691 Seoul YONHAP in English 0216 GMT
7 Dec 91*

[Text] Seoul, Dec. 7 (YONHAP)—South Korea will apply for a seat in the United Nations Conference on Disarmament, Foreign Minister Yi Sang-ok said Saturday.

The formal application would be submitted by the Korean Embassy in Geneva, where the conference has its headquarters, early next week, Yi told a weekly news conference.

The forty-member conference has a vacancy created by East and West Germany becoming a single member after unification.

The conference has agreed in principle to add four seats.

Membership is approved by consensus, and the results of conference negotiations are reported to the United Nations First Committee on Arms Reduction.

Both South and North Korea have had observer status at the conference since 1981. Ministry officials said North Korea was also likely to seek membership.

All U.S. Nuclear Arms Said Removed

SK1112091091 Seoul YONHAP in English 0854 GMT 11 Dec 91

[Text] Seoul, Dec. 11 (OANA-YONHAP)—The United States has removed all of its nuclear weapons from South Korea, a ranking government official said Wednesday.

"Our proposal to include Kunsan Airbase, where North Korea insists the United States stored its nuclear arsenal, in pilot simultaneous nuclear inspection with North Korea emphasizes the fact that there are no longer nuclear weapons at the American base," he said.

South Korean Foreign Minister Chong Won-sik earlier suggested in talks with his North Korean counterpart that the two Koreas conduct simultaneous inspections of military facilities selected by the other side.

"We wish to choose Sunchon airfield and the facilities at Yongbyon for pilot inspection. Your side may choose Kunsan Airbase or other military and civilian facilities for the pilot inspection project," Chong said.

Chong said the South would be ready to allow a North Korean inspection by Jan. 31, suggesting that the nuclear withdrawal was already complete.

Officials have been hinting that South Korea would announce in one form or another the absence of nuclear weapons on its soil since the Sept. 28 announcement by U.S. President George Bush of the removal of all tactical weapons deployed overseas.

"...we are prepared to include U.S. military installations and bases in the South on the list of facilities for inspection so that you can verify whether or not nuclear weapons are deployed here," Chong said.

If the North Koreans inspect Kunsan Airbase, it will be the first ever opening of U.S. military facilities overseas.

U.S. 'Unofficially' Informed North of Withdrawal

SK1612060591 Seoul TONG-A ILBO in Korean 16 Dec 91 p 1

[Text] It was learned on 16 December that the United States unofficially had notified the North side that it had completed the withdrawal of its nuclear weapons from the ROK and that, as a result, not only North Korea's signing of the nuclear safeguards accord but also the adoption of a North-South declaration on denuclearizing the Korean peninsula would proceed faster than expected.

A high-ranking ROK Government source said: "Ronald Lehman, director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, secretly visited Seoul on 8 December, just before the fifth North-South high-level talks, and discussed the nuclear issue with the ROK Government officials concerned." He also said: "During the discussion, the U.S. side made it clear that the United States already had informed the North side that it had completed the withdrawal of its nuclear weapons from the ROK. It also made it clear that the United States had coordinated views on the simultaneous nuclear inspection issue with the North Korean side on condition of North Korea's signing of the nuclear safeguards accord and its acceptance of international nuclear inspection."

This source also said: "The proposal that the nuclear facilities in Sunchon and Yongbyon, North Korea, and the Kunsan air base, South Korea, be inspected simultaneously on a trial basis is wholly a U.S. idea that Director Lehman brought in." He also said: "We know that in mapping out this plan, the United States contacted the North Korean side via many channels and that the United States and North Korea tacitly agreed that 'if North Korea decides to sign the nuclear safeguards accord and accept international nuclear inspection, to promote an environment for this, the United States would accept the simultaneous inspection of North and South Korean nuclear facilities.'"

It was learned that the "prior coordination of views" was possible because the North Korean side strongly hoped that the United States would positively provide a pretext for North Korea's signing of the nuclear safeguards accord.

This source also said: "Sooner or later, the North Korean side will express its intention to sign the nuclear safeguards accord." He said: "I cannot reject the possibility that North Korea may do so during the mid-December North-South contact in Panmunjom to discuss denuclearization."

This source also said: "Only when North Korea expresses its intention to sign the nuclear safeguards accord will North and South Korea be able to express their common views in a joint declaration on denuclearization or in any other form." He added: "This may be possible even before the sixth high-level talks in Pyongyang on 18 February 1992."

VIETNAM

Hanoi Supports DPRK Stand on Denuclearization

*BK0512163191 Hanoi VNA in English 1548 GMT
5 Dec 91*

[Text] Hanoi VNA Dec.5—Vietnam supports the Democratic People's Republic of Korea Government's stance on the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula as enunciated in the Nov. 25, 1991 statement of the DPRK

Foreign Ministry, and considers this to be a contribution to easing the situation in the world in general and on the Korean peninsula in particular.

So said a spokesman of the Foreign Ministry in an interview with VIETNAM NEWS AGENCY today.

The spokesman further said that nuclear control on the Korean peninsula must be done in an equitable reasonable manner.

POLAND**Agreement Reached on Transit of Soviet Troops***LD2911184391 Warsaw PAP in English 2219 GMT
27 Nov 91*

[Text] Warsaw, Nov. 27—The text of an agreement on the transit through Poland of Soviet troops being pulled out from Germany was reached by the Polish and Soviet negotiators during the 13th round of negotiations held in Warsaw November 26 and 27.

As for the troops being withdrawn from Poland, the present round dealt mostly with financial issues concerning the property used by the Soviets in Poland and problems of transportation.

The Polish delegation expressed readiness to start settling accounts for Soviet fixed assets to be left in Poland, simultaneously with Polish claims for damages, above all for ecological losses.

Under the agreement reached during the previous, 12th round in Moscow, all Soviet troops will be completely pulled out from Poland by November 15, 1992. The 14th round of talks is scheduled for the first half of January next year, to be preceded by talks of teams of experts.

Defense Ministry Updates Soviet Troop Withdrawal*LD1212035691 Warsaw PAP in English 1440 GMT
11 Dec 91*

[Text] Warsaw, Dec. 11—A total of 49 transports of Soviet troops withdrawn from Germany passed through the Polish territory between early April and December 10, 1991, Colonel Piotr Siliniewicz, the national Defence Ministry spokesman for Soviet troops withdrawal and transit told newsmen Wednesday.

In addition to that, 1,358 transports carrying supplies for the Soviet troops crossed Poland in transit, and 270 Soviet fighter planes flew over the Polish territory.

Continuation of Soviet Army Withdrawal Reported*LD1912032591 Warsaw PAP in English 1029 GMT
18 Dec 91*

[Text] Warsaw Dec. 18—Between April and November 1991, 4387 Soviet soldiers left Poland taking away 186 tanks and personnel carriers, and 2,109 vehicles, governmental plenipotentiary for stationing Soviet troops in Poland, General Zdzislaw Ostrowski said Tuesday.

The Polish authorities have taken over 100 buildings and 35,000 hectares of land left by the withdrawing Soviet Army.

In November, 3 combat and 27 logistic transports crossed Poland as part of the Soviet pull-out from former East Germany.

ROMANIA**Spokesman Discusses Progress of CSBM Inspections***AU0512103891 Bucharest ROMPRES in English
0926 GMT 5 Dec 91*

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES 5/12/1991—Among the topics approached by Foreign Ministry Ambassador Traian Chebeleu at his weekly news briefing were the main conclusions of the two reports made by Great Britain and France observers to inform the CSCE members about their recent visits in Romania for assessment on site of the information furnished by the Romanian side about its Armed Forces, in compliance with the provisions of the Vienna Convention on Measures to Build Confidence and Security (CSBM) in Europe.

The British report, informed the ambassador, shows that "the British team was satisfied with the assessment made" and that the British Government found the appraisal made by the Romanian side as entirely complying with the requirements of the Vienna Act and as a proof of the spirit of friendliness and openness shown by the Romanian side.

The report released by France to the European states, Canada, and USA reflects similar positive conclusions, showing that during the visit the data supplied by Romania were fully confirmed, that the members of the delegation could freely converse with militaries of all ranks and that none of the delegation's requests were rejected: "France wishes to stress the transparency and readiness manifested by the Romanian side. This ensured excellent conditions to our inspection and gave full satisfaction to the French experts who found that the provisions of the Vienna document were observed. The assistance provided by the Romanian side during the fact-finding tour proved their sincere wish for cooperation and openness, demonstrating that such actions are an instrument apt to build confidence between states," winds up the French report.

The two evaluation teams inspected the fighter plane regiment at Giarmata (Timisoara) and the operational tactical missiles brigade at Ineu.

Ambassador Chebeleu also informed that the appointment of Mr. Butrus Ghali as UN secretary general was viewed with satisfaction by Romania which appreciates Mr. Ghali as a reputed political personality, an established authority in international law, and a well-known diplomat, which recommends him as apt to fulfill the growing responsibilities of the UN secretary general in the present stage of international relations.

REGIONAL AFFAIRS

Andean Pact Nations Renounce Mass Destruction Weapons

*PA0512201391 Santa Fe de Bogota Emisoras Caracol
Network in Spanish 1200 GMT 5 Dec 91*

[Text] Cartagena— The Andean Pact Nations pledged to relinquish the possession, production, use, and testing of

all weapons of mass destruction. The agreement signed by the Andean presidents rules out the use of said weapons, be they nuclear, biological, toxic, or chemical. The Andean Pact presidents agreed to refrain from stockpiling or holding under any circumstances these types of weapons. They also requested the nations that hold these weapons of mass destruction to pledge not to use these weapons nor to threaten to use them against any Andean Pact nation.

BANGLADESH**Progress in Arms Control, Disarmament
Welcomed****Ambassador to UN**

92WP0088A Dhaka *THE NEW NATION* in English
30 Oct 91 p 1

[Text] Ambassador Humayun Kabir, Permanent Representative of Bangladesh to the United Nations, said here Monday that Bangladesh was committed to general and complete disarmament.

Participating in the general debate on disarmament in the first committee of the UN General Assembly he said that for this reason Bangladesh had rejected the nuclear alternative for herself, acceded to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and supported all measures seeking to promote disarmament and prevent arms race and the call for nuclear free zones.

He said that a dramatic change in the international scenario, end of the cold war, rapprochement of superpowers giving rise to cooperation instead of confrontation and mutual understanding propelling them into active interaction had made it possible for a start towards real disarmament and a joint endeavour to find a solution to global problems.

He said that radical changes in eastern Europe, reunification of Germany and the recent events in the Soviet Union would have far-reaching political and economic consequences on the world.

The end of the cold war, he said, had signalled the collapse in the international relations of two competing power blocs. New centres of economic and political power with new variables and alignments could emerge with yet uncertain consequences, he said.

Ambassador Kabir said that the evolving scenario was not unmixed with danger for the Third World countries. A major anxiety was whether it would compromise the political and economic security interests of developing countries either through regional hegemony or marginalisation. "We face a situation of both promise and peril," he said.

He welcomed the progress in arms control and disarmament, signing of strategic arms reduction treaty, accord on the conventional forces in Europe, reconvening of the amendment conference on the partial test ban treaty.

He also welcomed the recent historic initiative by President Bush to undertake unilateral measures to eliminate tactical nuclear weapons and the reciprocal offer by President Gorbachev to seek even deeper reduction of nuclear forces. He described these proposals as a major breakthrough toward a nuclear free and safer world.

He, however, said that despite treaty reductions, the super powers would continue to retain vast nuclear arsenals far in excess of any conceivable national security requirements.

He said the stupendous expenditure on armaments was unjustified and unethical. Mere weapons would not ensure security and peace and security would remain threatened as long as poverty, hunger, squalor and despair continued to bedevil the lives of billions.

He said that peace and security would not be achieved unless international cooperation was extended to deal with threats stemming from failure in development, environmental degradation and lack of progress in social and humanitarian issues.

Tactical Nuclear Arms Cuts Hailed

92WP0088A Dhaka *THE NEW NATION* in English
10 Oct 91 p 5

[Text] The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, NATO, has announced a plan to cut to half its stockpile of nuclear aircraft bombs in Europe. The decision to be given a formal seal at the Sicily meeting of the NATO Defence Ministers next week is in line with the latest move for comprehensive disarmament by slashing cold war arsenals. The United States has taken the lead in the wide-ranging cuts and decided to destroy nuclear artillery shells and short-range Lance missiles in Western Europe and South Korea; in addition to that nuclear cruise missiles at sea would be taken home for storage or destruction.

In the wake of such a bold decision of President Bush two weeks ago the Soviet Union also pledged on Saturday to join the United States in scrapping tactical nuclear weapons and announced other radical moves to trim the Soviet military machine. In concrete terms Moscow would eliminate all nuclear artillery shells and warheads for tactical missiles as well as tactical nuclear arms at sea. Gorbachev in his television speech also said that his country would take nuclear bombers and some 500 strategic missiles off combat alert and place many nuclear warheads in centrally controlled stockpiles. He went one step ahead by announcing an immediate one-year moratorium on nuclear testing.

These are all positive indications of a nuclear weapons-free world and both the superpowers have come a long way in securing phased elimination of lethal weapons capable of destroying the whole planet. Successive Superpower summits unequivocally stressed the urgent need for maintaining world peace in preference to arms race which can only hasten up self-annihilation which no member of the comity of nations would approve of. The reciprocity in eliminating tactical nuclear weapons brings new hope for mankind but still more targets have to be reached by the two superpowers in respect of stockpiles of long-range land-based nuclear missiles

tipped with more than one warhead. And that remains to be sorted out through dialogue under a new START Treaty.

It is heartening that NATO has successfully read the pulse and opted for positive actions in slashing cold war arsenals. In the NATO arsenal there are about 1400 U.S. free-fall nuclear aircraft bombs based in the alliance frontline while Britain has several hundred of its nuclear bombs kept in Belgium, The Netherlands, Turkey and Greece. Withdrawal or scrapping of all short-range weapons under the command of Atlantic alliance would not take more than two years, according to one source. That way, to quote President Bush, "something positive is happening in the world regarding the reduction of vast quantities of nuclear weapons."

The long-drawn cold war and nuclear arms buildup are phasing out thanks to the saner dispositions of the leaders of the Superpowers. The NATO decision is just the direct offshoot of the thinking of the United States and the Soviet Union. The crumbling of the dogma of Communism and march towards democracy by the East European countries have virtually minimised the gap between the two Power Blocs. Moreover, Gorbachev's economic reforms just on the verge of market economy has proved the atheistic breed a futile exercise as it has miserably failed to deliver the goods. Gradual democratisation of the entire Eastern bloc countries has drawn the

countries in both the camps closer and thereby denigrating the concept of arms race. Thus the entire humanity has been left with no other choice but peace, amity and harmony. Let the closing years of the 20th century be the harbinger of a durable world peace.

NEPAL

Prime Minister Comments on South Asia NFZ Issue

*BK0912035691 Delhi All India Radio Network
in English 0245 GMT 9 Dec 91*

[Text] The Nepalese prime minister, Mr. Girija Prasad Koirala, says that South Asia should not be singled out for making it a nuclear-free zone [NFZ]. He was talking to newsmen at Varanasi yesterday. Mr. Koirala said the issue of a nuclear-free zone should be seen in totality and in the world context.

On the forthcoming visit of the Chinese prime minister, Mr. Li Peng, to India, Mr. Koirala said it is a good development and hoped that Sino-Indian relations will be strengthened by the visit.

Later, Mr. Koirala arrived in Patna. He was received by the state chief minister, Mr. Lalu Prasad, at the airport.

RESPONSE TO BUSH INITIATIVE**Reports on U.S.-Soviet Strategic Stability Talks****Delegation Arrives in U.S.**

*LD2011185991 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 2342 GMT 19 Nov 91*

[By TASS correspondents Aleksey Berezhkov, Aleksandr Korolev, and Stanislav Lunev]

[Excerpt] Washington, 20 Nov (TASS)—The first Soviet-American meeting of the strategic stability group opens here today. A delegation of Soviet experts arrived in the U.S. capital to take part in the talks. The delegation is led by Aleksandr Yakovlev, member of the Political Consultative Council attached to the USSR president. The current work is headed by Vladimir Petrovskiy, first deputy minister of foreign affairs of the USSR. Also in the group are Yuriy Ryzhkov, member of the Political Consultative Council attached to the USSR president; Yevgeniy Primakov, director of the Central Intelligence Service; Sergey Stankevich, state councillor of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic; and representatives of foreign policy, military departments, and scientific circles. [passage omitted]

Commentary Views Meeting

*LD2011191491 Moscow Radio Moscow World Service
in English 1310 GMT 20 Nov 91*

[Commentary by Yuriy Solton]

[Text] A Soviet-American two-day meeting on strategic stability has opened in Washington. Commentary is by Yuriy Solton:

The meeting is unofficial and no documents are expected to be agreed upon. But its importance is great since this is an attempt by Washington and Moscow to set up a standing machinery for consultations on strategic stability. The aim is to forecast possible conflicts or crises and to develop recommendations to prevent them. That's what is positively new in Soviet-American relations.

When the Soviet Union and the United States replaced the policy of confrontation with partnership they started to fruitfully cooperate in disarmament and solving regional conflicts. (?Thus) they resolutely came out against the Iraqi aggression in Kuwait and recently they cochaired at the Madrid conference on the Middle East.

Now the two countries plan to put such cooperation on a regular basis. This naturally presupposes exchanges of information and even of that which earlier was considered top secret.

The composition of the Moscow delegation shows that Moscow is prepared to comprehensively discuss all acute issues. The head of the delegation is the member of the Soviet president's political consultative council,

Aleksandr Yakovlev. Among the delegates are the director of the Central Intelligence Service Yevgeniy Primakov, the Russian state adviser Sergey Stankevich, representatives of the military, Foreign Ministry's officials and scientists.

Some of our listeners have doubts whether the Soviet Union forming into individual republics can remain a superpower and indeed the United States' equal on the international scene. Such apprehensions appear to be exaggerated.

Aleksandr Yakovlev has handed over to President Bush the Soviet president's message on the recent developments in the Soviet Union. President Bush expressed satisfaction that in Moscow most of the republics have signed the economic agreement and approved the Union treaty on forming a confederation of democratic states.

As for the nuclear weapons, Aleksandr Yakovlev told in an interview to the American CNN television company that the State Council, involving leaders of all the republics, had decided to place it [as heard] under the central authorities' control.

Next Round To Meet in Moscow

*OW2511154091 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1435 GMT 25 Nov 91*

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The next round of Soviet-American consultations on strategic stability issues will be held in Moscow in January, First Deputy Foreign Minister Vladimir Petrovskiy has told IF's [INTERFAX's] correspondent.

With reference to the 1st round of such consultations held in Washington last week, V. Petrovskiy said that the two sides managed "to conduct an informal but detailed conversation on the changes taking place in the world today."

The main thing is not only to get an insight into these changes, but also plan joint actions to prevent these changes from upsetting international stability, Petrovskiy pointed out.

U.S. Moves Called For

*PM2911164991 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 28 Nov 91 First Edition p 3*

[V. Yakimenko commentary: "On Strategic Stability and Attendant Falsehoods"]

[Text] Strategic stability is an extremely complex military-political term. It includes the most varied factors which, when combined, ensure a peaceful life on our planet. It is an exceptionally complex task to describe and coordinate these factors. At the same time it must be noted that in the past few years the concept has formed that stability will be guaranteed in the military sphere if

deterrence is ensured, that is, if a situation is created whereby neither of the sides can count on striking the other side with impunity and without receiving a reciprocal strike of the appropriate strength.

Last year, the sides agreed at top level the basic and most obvious tasks involved in increasing strategic stability between themselves, which are to be realized following the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Weapons. What is primarily meant here is the further reduction of strategic weapons and a decrease in the concentration of nuclear charges on strategic delivery systems.

Whereas everything is apparently clear regarding the reduction of strategic weapons, the expediency of decreasing the concentration of nuclear charges requires clarification. Such a reduction (to one charge if possible) of the number of nuclear charges concentrated in one place should prevent the other side from counting on being able to destroy several of the other side's charges with just one of its own charges. Consequently the more charges of this type are concentrated in one place, the greater the instability of the situation.

Furthermore, it was decided, with the aim of increasing strategic stability, to give preference to systems possessing an enhanced survivability (these are the very systems that ensure guaranteed deterrence: It is believed that the most obvious method of ensuring deterrence is by giving strategic weapons the necessary mobility) and also to ensure a great measure of openness and availability of information about the sides' military organizational development and military intentions.

What is the situation in this sphere today? According to data in the treaty, the USSR's overall number of nuclear charges for strategic offensive weapons is 10,271 and United States' is 10,563. As far as the concentration of nuclear charges on one delivery system is concerned, (the overall number of nuclear charges divided by the number of existing strategic delivery systems) the USSR has 4.1 charges for every delivery system and the United States has 4.7 charges per delivery system. Only the USSR has mobile ICBM launchers (23 percent of the total number of ICBM launchers) The United States does not have any mobile launchers like this.

Nowadays you can sometimes come across the following formulation of the question (and not just in the West): The United States is apparently disarming rapidly, whereas we, despite all our difficulties, are not. But what is happening in reality?

The prospects for our military organizational development in the sphere of strategic forces are now strictly regulated by the treaty, not just regarding quantity, but also quality: New types of strategic offensive weapons are banned, and the modernization of certain types of ICBM's and other missiles is restricted, which will make it possible to determine quite clearly the structure of forces that will form after the treaty is implemented. Furthermore, the country's economic difficulties are in

practical terms preventing us from counting on the possibility of exchanging existing types of weapons for new ones unless the United States pushes us into such an extreme situation by their actions, for example, by creating and deploying antiballistic missile defense systems. Further reductions, in accordance with the USSR president's initiative, of the overall level of charges to 5,000 units instead of 6,000 as is stipulated by the treaty, was backed by concrete proposals on the removal of 503 ICBM's of certain types from alert status. Thus, three types of ICBM's which are deployed at present will be completely removed from the USSR's strategic forces: RS-10 (SS-11), RS-12 (SS-13), and RS-16 (SS-17).

In this respect the United States' intentions, despite all the noisy statements, look rather vague. The U.S. President's statement on the removal from alert status of "Minuteman-2" missiles (the oldest of the all United States' and USSR's ballistic missiles currently in operation) is not backed by any proposals on the further reduction of the overall level of charges on strategic offensive weapons comparable with Soviet initiatives. And moreover the United States is not renouncing the first nuclear strike. The United States' unilateral proposals on banning ICBM multiple reentry vehicles [MRV's] and making Soviet mobile ICBM's "stationary," which have repeatedly been mentioned in the press, do not only not concern U.S. strategic offensive forces, but go against the agreed tasks of strengthening stability.

Summing up the facts listed, it must be noted that if you admit that stability cannot be ensured just by one side—and this should not be doubted by anyone—then it is time for the American side to start moving more actively in order to cover its part of the road to be traveled.

Obukhov Discusses Soviet, U.S. Arms Talks

Offers Assurances to U.S.

OW0412173391 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1600 GMT 4 Dec 91

[Report on interview with Deputy Foreign Minister Aleksey Obukhov by "Diplomatic Panorama" correspondents Mikhail Mayorov and Igor Porshnev; transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] "We gave the American delegation firm assurances to the effect that all Soviet nuclear weapons were under centralized control and their sanctioned use was impossible," USSR Deputy Foreign Minister Aleksey Obukhov said in an exclusive interview he gave DP [Diplomatic Panorama]. Mr Obukhov led the Soviet delegation at the consultations in Washington on November 25-26 on the reduction of nuclear armaments within the framework of the proposals of presidents George Bush and Mikhail Gorbachev.

Mr Obukhov said both sides had confirmed their resolution to do everything within their power to ensure

complete implementation of the proposals. They were clearly aware that following a good example was a good way to accelerate the reduction of nuclear arsenals, naturally if this were combined with agreements that would be reached in the course of negotiations.

Issues Dealt With

According to the Deputy Foreign Minister, the issues discussed included some on which no mutual understanding had yet been achieved although both presidents bring them up in their proposals. There were matters on which both sides took completely identical positions and were working to implement them. But there were also some involving points which had yet to be clarified and on which joint programmes of action had yet to be worked out.

What the USSR Had To Suggest

The Soviet delegation suggested that both sides remove all nuclear ammunition from their tactical air force units and instal it on some centralized bases, for this would be an important step towards the aversion of the nuclear threat. In his speech on October 5 President Gorbachev also suggested that both sides stop the manufacture of fissionable materials for military purposes and that such a measure be subjected to mutual inspection.

The American delegation informed the Soviet one that these proposals were being considered by the Administration which would subsequently give the Soviet side its opinion of them.

What the USA Had To Suggest

The American delegation, which was led by the Deputy Secretary of State, Mr Reginald Bartholomew, again brought up the issue of a so-called limited non-nuclear anti-missile defence system.

"We need complete clarity here," said Mr Obukhov. "The Soviet side is willing to give consideration to the American proposal, but this doesn't yet mean we accept it."

We were ready to try and work out our basic attitude towards it and give our assessment of it, but we needed additional explanations which we were given in the course of the consultations," he said. "These explanations are now being analyzed, but we might have more questions later on, which means the consideration will take longer."

What the Americans were especially interested in, according to Mr Obukhov, the American side was particularly interested in whatever concerned the safe handling of nuclear weapons, control of them and their safe transportation and destruction. The U.S. delegation made a few proposals which were interesting from Mr Obukhov's point of view and were brought to Moscow. These are also being analyzed and will subsequently be dealt with by experts since "they bring up very specific

matters which have to be handled not only by diplomats but also by people actually working in those particular fields."

The American delegation offered the USSR assistance in the safe storage and destruction of nuclear weapons, for which the USA is willing to allocate funds, but the concrete scale and forms of such assistance will be decided on after the USSR has specified its requirements.

The Republics' Participation Was Not Purely Formal

According to Mr Obukhov, the participation of the representatives from the four sovereign nuclear republics, Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Byelarus [Belorussia], was "by no means purely formal", no more so than it had been in Moscow. They took active part in the discussions and made a substantial contribution to results achieved.

What the U.S. delegation was most eager to know was whether the former Union republics were willing to stick to the commitments assumed by the USSR in accordance with the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe and the START Treaty, in which connection both the central Foreign Ministry and those of the republics assured the Americans that all the commitments would be observed, said Mr Obukhov.

The American delegation wondered if the treaties would be ratified by the republics. The Ukrainian representative said they would and offered the American side the decisions to that effect taken by his republic's parliament and government.

The Next Round of Consultations

This will apparently be held in Moscow but the date has not yet been decided on, said Mr Obukhov.

U.S. Disarmament Viewed

LD0412183291 Moscow TASS in English
0850 GMT 4 Dec 91

[By TASS correspondent Andrey Surzhanskiy]

[Text] Moscow December 4 TASS—The United States is still not ready to stop nuclear tests and join the unilateral moratorium announced by the USSR, but it believes the reduction of nuclear stockpiles will influence the U.S. nuclear arms tests programme, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Aleksey Obukhov told TASS.

The U.S. will begin dismantling its nuclear warheads in the first half of 1992 and complete the task by 1997, said Obukhov, who led the Soviet delegation at the Soviet-American consultations on nuclear disarmament, held recently in Washington. The Soviets plan to eliminate some 15,000 nuclear warheads, encompassing a much greater scope. Naval tactical weapons will be eliminated

by 1995 and warheads of tactical missiles by 2000. The difference in time is explained by the greater scope of work in the USSR.

According to the Soviet diplomat, both the Soviet and American delegations reaffirmed the allegiance of their respective countries to the Soviet-American statement of June 1, 1990 concerning future talks on nuclear and space weapons. They also supported further consolidation of strategic stability, which allows the resumption of the negotiating process on this subject "without unnecessary delays."

Representatives of all the republics possessing nuclear weapons, specifically, Russia, Belorussia, the Ukraine and Kazakhstan, took part in the consultations. They reiterated their allegiance to the concept of "centralised nuclear control," Obukhov said.

Gorbachev Response to Bush Initiative Sketched

LD0812140591 Moscow Radio Moscow World Service
in English 1910 GMT 6 Dec 91

[Commentary by military observer Captain First Rank Aleksandr Yakovlev]

[Excerpts] In today's program our military observer, Captain First Rank Aleksandr Yakovlev, tells how the Soviet president's new initiatives to bring nuclear disarmament are being translated into reality in this country.

The Soviet Union, in particular, has already carried out a whole range of essential measures, says General Vladimir Lobov, the chief of the General Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces.

[Lobov is heard briefly in Russian, fading into English translation] The Soviet side is taking practical steps, Gen. Lobov said. I'd like to stress two of them: The Soviet Union has taken strategic aviation bombers off the round-the-clock duty. Besides, it has declared a moratorium on nuclear testing. Since the Soviet Union has been holding no nuclear tests for several years already it means that it has ceased developing nuclear weapons. Gen. Lobov went on to say that the Soviet Union has stopped modernizing a short-range nuclear missile for heavy bombers and a mobile small size intercontinental ballistic missile.

A hundred and twenty-nine intercontinental ballistic missiles have been taken off the round-the-clock duty. The elimination has begun of their silos. A total of 503 intercontinental ballistic missiles with 1,094 nuclear warheads are planned to be phased out. Three nuclear submarines with 44 missile launchers have already been withdrawn from the Navy. Three more with 48 missile launchers will also be withdrawn. Instead of 6,000 strategic missiles allowed by the START treaty, the Soviet Union plans to leave 5,000. Their dismantling will begin in the second half of next year and will be completed by the year 2000. The term is prolonged because the Soviet Union plans to eliminate much more weapons than the

United States. On the whole, 15,000 nuclear warheads will be scrapped. The profile [as heard] nuclear weapons reductions announced unilaterally by the Soviet Union and the United States are being carried out in keeping with the principle of goodwill and mutual trust.

GENERAL

Krasnoyarsk Plant To Cease Plutonium Production

924P0032A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
14 Nov Union Edition p 6

[Article by TASS correspondent Yu. Khots especially for IZVESTIYA: "Underground AES [Nuclear Electric Power Station] Will No Longer Produce Plutonium"]

[Text] This is the first report from the closed city not far from Krasnoyarsk. The underground nuclear station of the Krasnoyarsk mining-chemical combine is situated here at a depth of 250 meters. The station is in a subsiding condition—"running out." Its complete halt is a result of the initiative of the top leadership of the USSR and Russia to stop the production of fissionable materials.

The concrete road that stretches along the shore of the Yenisey leads to a tunnel situated at the base of an enormous mountain. It started to be laid in the 1950's, when the government made a decision to construct uranium graphite reactors for the production of U-239, and, to put it in a more straightforward way, material for atom bombs. In those days, the principle of building such facilities deep under ground began to be implemented.

It was believed at the beginning of the 1950's: Enemy aircraft will not reach the center of Siberia. Well, in fact, this underground facility is not threatened by anything today either, even a nuclear strike. According to all drafts, the facility is supposed to work in wartime as well. The 250-meter stone roof reliably covers the entire unit from above. The tunnels themselves have several widened areas that are capable of suppressing a shock wave that rushes into them. Water, which is necessary to such a "broth," is right nearby—there is plenty of it in the Yenisey.

And so we are at the end of our long journey. On the way, we estimated: Approximately as much cement was used in finishing off the tunnels as would be required for one more Krasnoyarsk hydroelectric power station. There is an atomic reactor at the bottom of each of the huge artificial "caverns."

"The first two reactors are doomed," says Pavel Morozov, the combine's deputy chief engineer who is escorting us. We will stop one at the beginning of July 1992, and the second—within a year or two. The matter is more difficult with the third machine. When we stop it, we will be left without heat and energy immediately. It

serves to heat a city of almost 100,000, the steam turns the generators of the electric power station.

We enter the office of Vladimir Kibo, the chief of the station.

"Starting from the moment that I came here 30 years ago as a graduate of an institute, I heard one thing—we are performing important work. Our former minister said from the stage in the House of Culture: 'Your combine was started, and the scale in the international arena became balanced. Because of our nuclear weapons, we are free.' And it is only now, probably, that we are beginning to understand that the resources directed at the manufacture of plutonium could be used for other work," explains Vladimir Nikolayevich.

"I think that our secrets did not last for a long time," Pavel Morozov said, joining the conversation. "There are interesting proposals on international cooperation. For example, French specialists are prepared to supply apparatuses for the measurement of neutrinos. Unfortunately, a resolution of this question is being delayed. But I am confident: Life will win out. Our specialists have begun to go abroad. Several years ago, we did not even dream of this! The proposed arrangement of especially pure production—gallium arsenide—will certainly lead to the fact that we will be forced to open our steel gates.

"This material is used for the manufacture of an elemental base in electronics. In the United States, for example, a program has been developed for its production estimated at \$2 billion. But at the Krasnoyarsk nuclear facility, it can be produced by investing far less resources. Next year, it is planned to obtain the first samples here, which in purity have no equal in our country....

"I am confident: Everyone who today meets with specialists from nuclear stations inevitably asks them about safety."

"The system of safety at a station is much more reliable than others," says Vladimir Kibo. "The appearance of the slightest malfunction automatically stops the reactor. Moreover, this takes only two seconds. I will not conceal this fact: There are several stoppages annually because of emergency signals. But not one of them resulted in emissions. Moreover, the world concept of the safety of nuclear facilities, besides increasing the reliability of the reactor itself, is directed in any event at preventing the escape of radiation from within the bounds of the station. And in this sense, the underground location guarantees us against any kind of accident. No other station in the world has such protection. After the Chernobyl catastrophe, a wave of protests arose in Krasnoyarsk that were associated with the construction in Atomgrad of a new underground storage site for radioactive materials—the regrettably well-known site No. 27. They were supported by people's deputies and local authorities. As a result, this idea had to be dropped."

"But will we not throw the baby out with the bathwater?" continues the director. "We cannot treat nuclear repositories in the same way that we treat highly technological production that is capable of giving a tangible benefit to the population of Krasnoyarskiy Kray. I emphasize that it is not a question of burying nuclear wastes, but of their storage. These are different things."

Incidentally, we talked about this just before our arrival at Atomgrad with USSR people's deputy and writer Roman Solntsev. He believes that, having nourished such a child, Siberian residents now have a right to receive a return from it. For this, it is necessary to finish building the second phase of the plant for the regeneration of the fuel of nuclear stations, in order not to store it aimlessly in huge water reservoirs, but to return it back to the station. It will be a lot cheaper for the country—not to acquire new tons of uranium, but to return it to the consumers. And to require that the managers of the combine share the profits with the kray.

By the way, this opinion is also held by Yu. Moskvich, the representative of the president of Russia in Krasnoyarsk. He thinks that both Krasnoyarsk and the rural rayons need substantial capital investments in medicine and in the social sphere. They can be given by the combine, if it is permitted to earn hard currency.

Soviet Change in UN Voting on Arms Issues Noted

*LD2011001491 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 0310 GMT 19 Nov 91*

[By TASS correspondent Yevgeniy Menkes]

[Text] United Nations, 19 Nov (TASS)—The USSR has changed the position to which it has adhered for many years on several so-called "traditional" disarmament resolutions during the examination of disarmament problems that was concluded here by the First Committee (political issues and issues of security, including disarmament) of the 46th session of the UN General Assembly.

The Soviet delegation abstained during the vote on a resolution on freezing nuclear weapons. In past years the USSR invariably voted for this resolution. In his address, the Soviet representative noted that in light of present-day realities, the issue of a freeze on nuclear weapons is no longer topical.

The same sort of change in the approach of the USSR was seen in voting on resolutions on Israel's nuclear weapons and on the nuclear potential of South Africa. Here, too, the "need to take account of new realities" was the springboard.

As regards the resolution on creating a nuclear free zone in southern Asia, the USSR, which had previously always abstained, this time voted "for". This attracted particular attention here, since a similar document has traditionally been proposed at all sessions since 1974 by

Pakistan "to spite" its powerful neighbor, India. For its part, New Delhi has always voted against and considered in so doing that the neutrality of Moscow was guaranteed. At the same time, diplomats here recall that the Soviet Union has usually supported the creation of nuclear free zones in certain regions. Southern Asia was formerly the only exception. This time the exception was not made.

In terms of the results of voting, the Soviet Union is more and more often outside the large group of states dominated by representatives of the "Third World," which ensures that certain resolutions are given the "green light." This was the case, for example, with resolutions on a freeze and on the nuclear potential of South Africa and Israel. At the same time, during consideration of the question of the nuclear potential of Israel, only 65 delegations voted "for," while 64 abstained, three were against, and 32 did not take part.

Spokesman on Strategic Deterrent Forces, Army Reorganization

LD2211181191 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1537 GMT 22 Nov 91

[By TASS correspondent Yevgeniy Nikitin]

[Text] Moscow, 22 Nov (TASS)—Strategic Deterrent Forces [strategicheskkiye sily sderzhivaniya] will be the name of a new branch of the USSR Armed Forces, created on the basis of the strategic missile forces, the ballistic missile early-warning system, space monitoring, antiballistic-missile defense, and the directorate of the head of space hardware. Army General Yuriy Maksimov has been appointed commander-in-chief of the Strategic Deterrent Forces. Aviation and naval strategic nuclear forces will be subordinate to him in operational matters. This was reported today at a briefing for Soviet and foreign journalists by Lieutenant General Valeriy Manilov, head of the USSR Defense Ministry Information Directorate. The briefing dealt with the most topical problems of military construction and the life and activities of the Armed Forces.

Those present were informed that on 4 and 14 November the USSR State Council examined military policy issues and the functioning of the Armed Forces. The essence of the decisions adopted by the State Council comes down to preserving united Armed Forces which must function in a common military-strategic area. It was stressed that the status of the USSR Armed Forces, established by present legislation, be preserved on the territory of the sovereign republics (states). The proposal was approved to create a consultative body under the USSR Defense Ministry—a council of defense ministers and chairmen of the sovereign republic's committees on defense matters. The State Council also adopted a decision which obliges the Defense Ministry and the bodies of executive authority in the sovereign republics to ensure on their territories an organized call-up of citizens to actual military service in the fall this

year in the agreed numbers. The briefing also reported on progress in implementing the USSR law "On the amnesty for servicemen evading military service." It was stressed that its validity ends on 4 December. So far, 220 of 6,000 servicemen being sought have given themselves up.

NUCLEAR & SPACE ARMS TALKS

SVC, JCIC Discuss INF, START Implementation

LD0212194191 Moscow TASS in English 1850 GMT 2 Dec 91

[Text] Geneva December 2 TASS—The 12th session of the U.S.-Soviet special control commission [SVC] set up under the U.S.-Soviet Treaty on the Elimination of Short- and Medium-range Missiles [INF Treaty] opened in Geneva on Monday.

The Soviet and U.S. experts will focus on the implementation of the treaty and hold discussions with the joint commission on inspections [JCIC] set up in accordance with Article 15 of the U.S.-Soviet START [Strategic Arms Reduction] treaty.

The sides will also discuss other issues pertaining to both treaties.

START TALKS

Deputy Minister on Strategic Missile Forces

PM1911115591 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 16 Nov 91 First Edition p 3

[Interview with Army General Yu. Maksimov, commander in chief of the Strategic Missile Forces and USSR deputy defense minister, by Major A. Dolinin; place and date of interview not given: "Army General Yu. Maksimov: Motherland's Missile Shield Should Preserve Reliability"—first paragraph is introduction]

[Text] On the eve of Missile Forces and Artillery Day our correspondent met with Army General Yuriy Pavlovich Maksimov, commander in chief of the Strategic Missile Forces and USSR deputy defense minister. The talk which took place, however, was by no means of a "festive" nature. It was devoted to the present and future of the Strategic Missile Forces and the missile men's complex problems.

[Dolinin] Yuriy Pavlovich, the positive changes in the military-political situation which have taken place in the world in recent years have substantially reduced the threat of the outbreak of nuclear war. In this connection what are the role and function of our strategic nuclear forces under the new conditions?

[Maksimov] You are right: The threat of a world nuclear missile war and a wide-scale military conflict has now in practice been reduced to a minimum. But the positive changes in the military-political and military-strategic

situation have by no means removed the problem of our country's security. Judge for yourself. The Warsaw Pact has been dissolved yet the NATO bloc remains. The United States has not renounced its "from a position of strength" policy and is leading matters to the point where, to use G. Bush's expression, a new world order will be unipolar with a leading role for the United States on the basis of the conservation of its military and economic might. The main avenues of the improvement of the U.S. Armed Forces—the priority implementation of long-term programs for the development of strategic offensive arms and the continuation of work on the SDI program—also remain unchanged.

All this makes it possible to conclude that the military danger for our country has not ceased to be a reality. That means that together with political measures, it is sensible to resolve the task of preserving peace and preventing war on condition that military-strategic parity is maintained with a consideration for our state's course toward the substantial reduction of the level of military confrontation. A very important role here also belongs to the country's strategic nuclear forces, of which the Strategic Missile Forces are the basis.

[Dolinin] Right now the country's military-political leadership is studying new approaches toward building the Armed Forces. In your view, what changes will take place in the Strategic Missile Forces?

[Maksimov] You know that within the framework of the forthcoming reform it is proposed to create a system of Union and republic organs of defense. It is proposed to transfer to civilian ministries some of the functions of deciding defense questions. There will be a change to the branches of the Armed Forces and their tasks and organizational and staff structures. In practice many reform measures are already being implemented in the Missile Troops. There is the reduction of a number of formations and units, the abolition of the intermediate-range missiles—a whole class of missiles—the upgrading of a number of units to form complexes with better qualitative specifications, the reduction of the numerical strength of troops and organs of management... The implementation of the Strategic Offensive Arms Limitation treaty is next in line. And in the near future there will be the creation of a new type of Armed Forces—the strategic deterrent forces which in addition to other components of the Strategic Nuclear Forces will be based on the strategic missile forces.

The process of implementing military reform will be continued for quite a long time. Here there will be organizational and staff changes and it is planned to optimize the structure of management of troops and weapons. There will be an increase in their combat capability, mobility, tenacity, and ability to overcome ABM systems and strike targets with any degree of defense.

All this should ensure the maintenance of the existing military-strategic parity at a lower level and at the same time the missile forces' reliable solution of the tasks set them.

[Dolinin] How will these radical changes affect the fate of the present missilemen?

[Maksimov] As of now we have virtually completed the deployment of officers released during the implementation of the treaty on the elimination of intermediate and shorter-range missiles. The overwhelming majority have gone to swell the numbers in areas which are at present understaffed or have been appointed to posts in place of those who have been released into the reserve for reasons of age. All this work has been performed without serious rebukes from the officers. Not one of them has been released without pension rights and stipulated benefits, except for those who have discharged for failing to meet the requirements of their posts or who have received a dishonorable discharge. We have the firm conviction that during the implementation of the treaty on strategic offensive arms which has been signed, the fate of each officer will also be resolved with tact and attention.

At the same time I shall stress that as before we shall experience a great shortage of cadres for primary officers posts. That is why any arguments by a certain section of young officers and military school cadets of the missile forces to the effect that they cannot see any future in service are without foundation.

[Dolinin] But today voices are being heard increasingly frequently about the reduction of the strategic nuclear arms right up to their complete destruction...

[Maksimov] Indeed, an enormous nuclear potential has been accumulated in the world which could destroy everything living on earth many times over. Therefore there is simply no alternative to its reduction, right up to its complete elimination. But here we must not forget the realities which have taken shape in the world. Primarily the balance of nuclear forces between the USSR and the United States and the other nuclear powers. This equilibrium can be destroyed both by the further arms race and by unilateral disarmament. After all it is dangerous not only to climb a steep hill but also to climb down.

In order in the future to reduce still further the threat of the outbreak of war it is essential to ensure strategic nuclear stability by preserving parity of forces. Here the level of nuclear arms should be reduced on a mutual basis. This is now being demonstrated by the United States and the USSR as states with the most powerful nuclear potential. Subsequently I hope that this process will also be joined by Britain and France. For instance, in the Strategic Missile Forces it is planned to make a 30 percent reduction to the number of missile launchers and a more than 50 percent reduction to the number of warheads over the course of seven years. Stationary missile complexes will be subject to reduction. Mobile complexes which ensure a high degree of tenacity in

retaliatory actions, as most fully according with the defensive nature of Soviet military doctrine, do not come under this treaty.

[Dolinin] Political stability is also needed to preserve peace. But the collapse of the USSR is continuing. Will the declaration of state independence by a number of former Union republics affect the fate of the country's strategic forces and the possibility of ratifying the treaty on the reduction of strategic offensive arms?

[Maksimov] I am deeply convinced that only a renewed united Union and united Armed Forces of our state can ensure effective sovereignty, independence, and security both for the country as a whole and for each individual republic. On the other hand without the joint efforts of all republics it is impossible to retain a modern army, whose maintenance is no simple matter even for the Union. Still less is it within the economic powers of an individual republic. That is why my opinion of the fate of the strategic nuclear forces and in particular the missile forces is absolutely unequivocal: They must be united, remain for the time being within their existing grouping and be managed centrally. This is also mentioned in the resolution of the fifth Congress of USSR People's Deputies and in the November decision of the country's State Council. That is why in ratifying the strategic offensive arms treaty I believe there should be no substantial obstacles from the republics. Its ratification and implementation accords with their interests since it is one more step toward reducing the nuclear danger for all and the reduction of the level of military confrontation in the world.

We must also consider something else. The resolution of the fifth Congress of USSR People's Deputies instructed the country's president, Supreme Soviet, and State Council to ensure the continuity of power in the transitional period and to observe unconditionally all international agreements and commitments adopted by the USSR, including those on questions of arms reduction and control. So far our country has been and remains a united nuclear power and a single possessor of nuclear weapons. Their proliferation is banned by international treaties and no one is permitted to act in such a way that instead of a single nuclear power—the USSR—several appear within the framework of the country. On the international plane we do not have the legal right to do this.

[Dolinin] Will new problems arise with regard to the provision of weapons and military equipment for the missile forces under the conditions of the conversion of the defense sectors of industry and the market economy?

[Maksimov] Conversion has now encompassed virtually all defense industry enterprises ensuring deliveries of weapons and equipment to the missile forces. Under the conditions of the shortage of consumer goods in our country, the use of this powerful scientific and technical

and production potential will undoubtedly make it possible to improve the quality and volume of general-purpose output. But I would highlight two aspects in this problem.

First, to preserve the necessary level for the defense industry in the process of conversion we need a unified state conversion program. Right now its elaboration is being complicated by the lack of a Union Treaty and by existing differences in views between the sovereign republics and the center as to the aims and methods of conversion. In this situation it is essential primarily to preserve the existing scientific and technical and production potential of the defense industry and the cooperation in the development and production of missile weapons which has taken shape in the country over a long period. The defense enterprises which produce output solely for the missile forces are now situated on the territories of a number of republics and from the viewpoint of safeguarding the country's security the destruction of their production ties is impermissible.

And the second aspect. The transition to market relations, to contract and free prices under the conditions of the restriction of expenditure on defense create considerable difficulties in the fulfillment of the planned programs for the essential qualitative improvement of the Strategic Missile Forces. In addition urgent measures will be needed to prevent the drain of highly skilled specialists from defense enterprises.

It must be supposed that all these difficulties connected with the transitional period will be overcome with time.

[Dolinin] And a last question, Yuriy Pavlovich. KRASNAYA ZVEZDA readers, remembering the events of those three days in August, are raising particularly keenly the question of the control of nuclear forces. How safe is our country and the whole world today from the unauthorized use of nuclear weapons?

[Maksimov] I repeat my reminder that our military doctrine, which is of a defensive nature, provides for the use of nuclear weapons only in retaliatory actions. During the days of August 1991 no one threatened us with nuclear weapons so that means that they could not be used on our side.

As for the danger of the use of nuclear weapons because of an error or deliberate actions by individual violators or groups of people, then the protection system existing in the Strategic Missile Forces provides multiple safeguards against the use of nuclear weapons and rules out the possibility of one person making a decision and using them without authorization. So that any blackmail or pressure under those conditions was ruled out. In addition through the additional organizational and technical measures which have been adopted the ensuring of nuclear safety was strengthened even more at that moment and the system for the protection of nuclear weapons functioned irreproachably.

I want to stress that the missile troops are too serious a branch of the Armed Forces to be drawn into any political adventures.

Commentary on U.S. Military Expenditures Plan
LD3011090791 Moscow Radio Moscow World Service
in English 0000 GMT 28 Nov 91

[Commentary by Vladislav Kozyakov]

[Text] Though the United States present military expenditures, with the account of inflation, are 1 percent less than last year, they reflect a new approach. This year large scale measures will be carried out to reduce the number of the American troops, warships, and some programs to reduce weapons. There is also a marked delay in the production of the strategic bombers B-2, each costing over \$860 million. Generally speaking, the United States (?is to) start carrying out its plan, according to which the defense expenditure by the mid-90s, in relation to the total economic expenditure, will be the lowest as compared to the pre-war times. They believe in the Pentagon that by 1995 the country's Armed Forces will be reduced by 25 percent.

But are the plans to reduce the defense efforts equivalent to the radical changes that take place in the world? How can it be explained that the programs to create new types of strategic weapons, conceived way back in the cold war years, are still preserved in America? For example, the Trident missiles for the [word indistinct] submarines were meant for waging military operations against the Soviet Union which is non-existent in its former shape. But the development of these and similar weapons continue. Or take another example—the present American budget allocates almost \$12 billion to the Energy Department to produce new nuclear warheads, and it's at the time when Moscow and Washington start eliminating thousands of nuclear charges. It is at the time when the American Senate has decided to set aside \$700 million to help Moscow eliminate tactical nuclear arms. [Words indistinct] not so simple towards the reduction of the military expenditures and armaments in such a way that it would be equivalent to the changes going on in the world. And it could be attributed not only to America but to this country too. Here too, there are all sorts of discrepancies alongside the sharp reduction in the arms manufacturing. For example, tanks continue to be produced though according to the treaty on the conventional arms in Europe, the Soviet side is to scrap thousands of tanks.

It seems that the reduction of the military expenditures and armaments (?is the sphere) where our two countries always start to intensify their activities. The (?main) efforts are ahead. Now in Moscow both MPs [members of parliament] and military experts advance the idea to speed up the conversion and further reduce allocations for defense. For its part, in Washington the idea is being discussed to reduce military expenditure by \$50 billion within five years—that is more than according to the

current plans. Now that our countries have stopped being enemies, our avenues are open for the initiatives in this sphere.

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

SVC Envoy on INF Implementation, 'Nuclear Stability'

LD0812044991 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 1313 GMT 7 Dec 91

[By TASS correspondent Boris Shabayev]

[Excerpts] Geneva, 7 Dec (TASS)—The treaty between the USSR and the United States on eliminating medium and shorter-range missiles [INF] was an unprecedented breakthrough in the disarmament sphere. The document signed in December 1987 in Washington was thus described by Ambassador Mikhail Streltsov, head of the Soviet delegation in the Special Verification Commission [SVC] which was set up to implement the treaty in practice, and which is currently in session in Geneva. [passage omitted]

The new situation which has arisen following the proclamation of independence by the republics which are members of the Union naturally engenders its own problems, Ambassador Streltsov commented. For example, on the territory of the Baltic states there are installations which in accordance with the agreement on medium- and shorter-range missiles should still be subject to inspections for another 10 years. How is this problem to be tackled? Another example: The treaty on strategic offensive weapons sets "ceilings" on certain forms of weapons, some of which are located on the territory of the Ukraine. Who will ratify this treaty? At the expense of which republic will the reduction take place? A major component of strategic security is nuclear stability, and maintenance of this security insistently demands that the situation should be clarified without delay, and that we should not stand still or allow any pause in the process of disarmament which is now gathering speed.

CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN EUROPE

Forces in Belorussia To Be Cut by 120,000

OW2011191891 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1745 GMT 20 Nov 91

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] It has become known to INTERFAX from circles close to the Belorussian Government that the commandant of the Belorussian Military District is planning reducing the forces deployed in the republic by a third, or 120,000 men.

That is to be announced Thursday [21 November], at the Minsk officers' club holding a meeting of armed forces deputies with local public organisations. The meeting is sponsored by the Fund for the Servicemen's Social Protection and the Belorussian Servicemen's Union.

The agenda may also include a possible formation of Belarus' [Belorussia] own armed forces.

Reports on Soviet Troop Withdrawal From Estonia

Second Air Assault Battalion Disbanded

*OW2111185291 Moscow BALTFAX in English
1739 GMT 21 Nov 91*

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Estonia's state minister Raivo Vare said in Estonian parliament on November 19 that a second air-assault battalion that had been stationed near the town of Vyru had been disbanded and its equipment had been moved out of Estonia. Not all officers left Estonia, said Mr Vare. Some of them were transferred to other military units on the republican territory.

Spokesman on Army Property, Customs

*LD2511190291 Tallinn Radio Tallinn Network
in Estonian 1000 GMT 25 Nov 91*

[Statement by government press secretary Juhan Hindov]

[Excerpts] Today's Estonian Government session discusses the USSR Armed Forces' withdrawal from the Republic of Estonia. So far, only unofficial information has been received about the withdrawal of units of the Union army. With a corresponding resolution, the government today decided that control will be introduced over military units' transport and that any withdrawal of forces is to be coordinated with the State Chancellery. In this way, essential control will be exercised over any deals done in respect to buildings, structures, and other real estate at the disposal of and in the use of the Army. The government decided to stop such deals until a corresponding Supreme Council resolution is adopted. The deals already done may be in accordance with the economic interests of the Republic of Estonia but ambiguity with respect to the status of the Union Army in the Republic of Estonia and property deals conducted with the stepped-up withdrawal of the military units may also be the cause of the national wealth being scattered around. For this reason, the government decreed that deals done with respect to any property at the disposal of the Army are valid only when they are registered by the local government.

Mati Jurgens, director general of the customs department, acquainted the government with the republic's draft customs regulations for individuals. [passage omitted].

The maximum value of duty-free goods permitted to be taken out by an individual is 1,000 rubles. This amount will be revised monthly according to changes in the ruble's purchasing power. Hard currency may be brought in in unlimited amounts and free of duty. Undeclared hard currency up to a value of \$1,000 may be taken out. The government endorsed in principle the customs regulations for individuals. Amendments and remarks made at the session will be included in the regulations in the course of their implementation. [passage omitted]

Armored Troop Withdrawal Schedule Announced

*LD2611153691 Tallinn Radio Tallinn Network
in Estonian 1300 GMT 26 Nov 91*

[Text] The Government of the Republic of Estonia reports that, according to agreements, columns of military armored transport carriers will be withdrawn from the territory of the Republic of Estonia from Tallinn, Kuressaare, and Rakvere at the end of November and the beginning of December. These columns will be made up of 55 combat vehicles. The withdrawal of the military unit will take place along the Tallinn-Rakvere-Narva route. Local governments have been given instructions to ensure unhindered passage to the military columns.

Officers Concerned Over Withdrawal From Baltic States

Naval Officers Appeal for Consultation

*PM2511124991 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
21 Nov 91 p 6*

[Report by correspondent Yu. Stroganov: "Fleet Personnel Discontented"]

[Text] Kaliningrad Oblast—Fleet personnel have now joined in the protests repeatedly voiced by representatives of the Ground Forces at their likely accelerated withdrawal from the Baltic states—this is what is actually demanded from the Union. Officers of the Baltic Fleet, along with servicemen of the Baltic Military District and Baltic Border District and veterans, held a meeting in the city of Baltiysk, Kaliningrad Oblast, where they elected a coordinating council and adopted an appeal to the presidents of the USSR and the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic, the Baltic countries' leaders, and the Russian Supreme Soviet. "In the runup to the start of talks between delegations of the USSR and the Baltic states, neither side has attempted to find out our opinion on the prevailing situation and the possible tragic consequences of the immediate withdrawal of troops," the appeal says in particular. "All decisions on the timetable for withdrawal and the new places of deployment of troop units, enterprises, and institutions should be made only on agreement with the coordinating council. We will not leave our garrisons and facilities without ensuring normal social and everyday conditions at the new places of deployment of troops agreed with the authorities of the republics."

The collapse of the USSR and the critical political situation in Russia painfully affect us—servicemen, workers, employees, and veterans of the Soviet Army and Navy, our families, and all representatives of the Russian-speaking population in the Baltic states, the appeal asserts.

'Two Years' Needed for Troop Withdrawal

LD2711171191 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0350 GMT 27 Nov 91

[Text] Moscow, 27 Nov (TASS)—A minimum of two years is needed for the withdrawal of Baltic Military District troops from the Baltic states so that the economy of the republic does not "suffocate," said Colonel V. Kandalovskiy, chairman of the officers' assemblies of the Baltic Military District, in an interview for the KRASNAYA ZVEZDA. Otherwise, the transport arteries will be completely paralyzed. This is because hundreds of thousands of loads, shells, containers, and equipment are to be withdrawn.

Citing the press bureau of the USSR Ministry of Defense, Col. Kandalovskiy said the situation is complicated by the fact that the ministry has no troop withdrawal plan. There is a disbandment plan. "This is worse," stressed the Kandalovskiy. "People are simply being thrown out onto the street." The situation would not seem so depressing if the immovable capital of the district—amounting to 150 billion rubles—formed the basis of funds for the social protection of servicemen. However, the property of the district is being sold for a song, and money is being transferred to the USSR Ministry of Defense, where it halts.

Recently, at the districtwide officers' assembly in Riga, a decision was adopted not to submit "to some orders of the command" (on disbandment) [TASS note], the newspaper writes.

Estonian Deputy Comments

OW0212180791 Moscow BALTFAX in English 1510 GMT 2 Dec 91

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] A deputy to the Estonian parliament, Juri Liim, has informed BF [BALTFAX] that representatives from Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Russia held a preliminary meeting in the Estonian Government's residence in Lohusalu near Tallinn at which they discussed the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the Baltics.

Mr. Liim, who had taken part in the meeting, said Baltic representatives had called on Russia to "use the means at its disposal to bring forward the withdrawal of Soviet forces". In particular they insisted that the Soviet units stationed in the capitals of the three states be pulled out immediately.

The Estonian side also believes that the specialised units and the forces that may be used for offensive purposes

should be withdrawn immediately. Estonia is making a claim to some of the modern weapons and equipment in possession of the Soviet forces for it made considerable financial contributions to the maintenance of Soviet defence capacity in the past.

Mr. Liim said that at the forthcoming talks Russia intends to discuss the possibility of Estonian citizenship being granted to former Soviet servicemen. He said Russia is expected to name the day for the beginning of the negotiations this week. They may start in the first half of December.

Withdrawal To Begin in 1994

OW0112025091 Moscow BALTFAX in English 1715 GMT 29 Nov 91

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The Soviet Defense Ministry's spokesman Valery Manilov has announced a decision due to the political reality concerning the transformation of the Baltic military region into the North-western forces. In his words, "the military has already completed all of the essential work to begin the resulting political negotiations on removing Soviet forces from Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia."

Manilov confirmed that the Soviet troops stationed in the Baltics would only be removed once all Soviet forces in Poland and Germany had returned home. This means that troop removal from the Baltics would not begin before the end of 1994. All those transferred to the reserve or having resigned, regardless of place of residence, will be given a pension for life paid out of funds from the Soviet Defense Ministry payment will continue in the corresponding currency after the Baltics have introduced their own currencies.

Manilov Interviewed on Withdrawal

LD0312151891 Moscow All-Union Radio Mayak Network in Russian 0100 GMT 3 Dec 91

[Interview with Lieutenant General Valeriy Leonidovich Manilov, chief to the Ministry of Defense information directorate, by correspondent Tatyana Chemodanova; place and date not given—recorded]

[Text] [Manilov] The main provision of this problem is that a fundamentally new status for the group based on the territory of independent sovereign states has been established by the president. Now it is the northwestern group of forces. It is a group that is stationed on the territory of a foreign state and its operation, its provision with vital necessities should legally conform with international law, with our legislation. The position on the status of servicemen, their provision, the displacement of troops, guaranteeing defense tasks, their operation, that is to say the daily activity of that group should be defined very clearly, on the basis of bilateral agreements, on the basis of talks.

[Chemodanova] How long will the northwestern group of troops operate?

[Manilov] That depends upon the character of the interstate agreement and, on a reciprocal basis, what time scale is determined. However, the reality is such that evidently it is unlikely that a large-scale withdrawal of troops from the territory of the independent Baltic states can be implemented before the end of 1994, and first of all namely because to withdraw troops from the territory of these states it is necessary to prepare a whole infrastructure, first of all, housing, social provision—that is tens of thousands of people that the state should take care of.

[Chemodanova] Many discharged and reserve servicemen remaining on the territory of the Baltics are interested in the question of how they will be guaranteed their pension.

[Manilov] Speaking of the servicemen who will be discharged, become reservists, or retire and who will have the right to receive a pension from the Ministry of Defense, all these people, to the last man, will receive a pension from the Ministry of Defense and that has no prescription. They will all be provided for by the Ministry of Defense.

Officers Fear 'Social Explosion'

PM0212150791 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA
PRAVDA
in Russian 27 Nov 91 p 1

[Interview in Riga with Colonel V. Kandalovskiy, chairman of the officers' assemblies of the Baltic Military District, by correspondent K. Markaryan; date not given: "Even If Tanks Are Supplied to One Another, No Houses Will Result"]

[Text] Riga—Representatives of 178 divisions, regiments, and battalions decided at the recent all-district officers' assembly in Riga not to obey certain orders from the command. "We military people have always regarded an order as the law," the assembly resolution states. "But an order for our withdrawal and disbandment without guaranteed social backup will be rated a crime. This leaves us with the moral right not to fulfill it."

[Kandalovskiy] The officers' assemblies should not be viewed as a movement in defense of purely material interests. With the present revolution, as with any other, chaos—political, economic chaos—commences, and those who come to power at a time of crisis are under a tremendous temptation to use totalitarian methods under the slogan of defending democracy. The French Revolution perished in that way, and democracy and freedom were consumed by it in 1917. In Russia too there was a recent attempt to resolve matters with strong-arm methods—it was stopped. But now people are trying to do this in respect of the Army: to disband

the district without social protection for people, without providing them with housing, without observing human rights.

[Markaryan] Was it a coincidence that these words were heard at the assembly: "We intend to defend ourselves, and we have the means with which to do so"?

[Kandalovskiy] We have little faith today that anyone will trouble himself about us. We are disciplined and act within the framework of the law. But look: This year alone diverse property to the value of 14.599 billion rubles [R] has been sold in our district. And all of it at clearance prices! A K-760 motorcycle goes for R300, and a KamAZ truck tends to go for just a few thousand! Yet they resell our hardware for really big money.

We have sent this R14.5 million to the Ministry of Defense but have not gotten a single kopek back. The money ends up with bribetakers and cooperative members.

[Markaryan] Have you decided to engage in selling off property yourselves?

[Kandalovskiy] We do not intend to get involved in commerce, but we want to know clearly where the money will go, what we will get out of this, and what the state will get. We have proposed our own social protection program. Its main points are the creation of a Union socioeconomic program, the commander's housing fund, and a district council fund to tackle social problems. The intention is this: The commander constructs housing, and the council provides a terminal allowance so that a person can leave not just with a roof over his head but also with a kopek in his pocket—because he must be helped to start normal production activity. We have no need of money from elsewhere for this, since the district's own real estate is worth R150 billion.

[Markaryan] Will your first step be to sell submachine guns to Baltic border guards?

[Kandalovskiy] As long as the Soviet Armed Forces are here and their status has not been defined, we are opposed to squandering weapons. Literally a few days ago the "Sajudis" City Council sent the Vilnius Division an ultimatum to withdraw by 31 December. Sajudis is trying to put the pressure on: If you do not leave, we will give you a hard time. But they do have problems with weapons at present. What if both sides end up with weapons? This could go so far that no one will any longer be able to stop anything....

But what we are more concerned about now is the emergence of an official structure at the Defense Ministry which is trying to engage in commerce. The so-called "Defender of the Homeland" fund has been set up in Moscow. Its chief task is formulated as being to help servicemen and Afghanistan veterans. It is headed by Chief of the General Staff Lobov. No secret is made of the fact that the fund will engage in entrepreneurial

activity, i.e. sell weapons, and the proceeds will apparently go to defend the defender of the homeland. Answer me: Are we living in a civilized state or, please pardon me, do they take us for idiots? Name just one country where commercial enterprises have been created under an official state organ to engage in trade and are headed by the top men. What is this, if not the use of an official position?

We have already received the first coded telegram: Stop all sales, audit property, and send lists to Moscow. Instructions have already arrived from all the Defense Ministry directorates with regard to what is to be sent to them, when, and by which trains. But there are no troop withdrawal programs. And so we ask: Where will the proceeds go? Which army do they intend to supply at our expense—Ukrainian, Azerbaijani? Who will dispose of this money?

[Markaryan] You accuse Moscow of commercialization, but what about yourselves?

[Kandalovskiy] But it is not a question of commerce! The problem is that it is not the commander who manages the district's property today but various Moscow directorates—communications, trade, engineering troops, technical means, propaganda. We are asking that people apply to the commander when making any deals, not to their own structural subdivisions. We can conclude a treaty with any firm or concern, make it a monopolist (thus cutting out bribetakers), for control purposes put our own representatives from the council of officers' assemblies into this concern...

[Markaryan] A version of independence within the district?

[Kandalovskiy] No, all the property belongs to the Ministry of Defense. But each item of property must have one master, not a multitude of directorates.

[Markaryan] Are you not afraid of being labeled rebels?

[Kandalovskiy] No, as long as we act within the framework of the law...

[Markaryan] As long as?

[Kandalovskiy] If we fully exhaust all democratic methods and if we are not heeded, we will be forced to adopt a tough democratic decision. Our attitude to orders has changed since the August events. When the defense minister ended up in the "Sailors' Rest," we realized that there are orders and orders.

[Markaryan] What is the reaction of the district commander to all this?

[Kandalovskiy] There are no problems with the commander at present. He realizes that, unless we preserve order, discipline, and troop control, all this could collapse under a hail of problems. The commander has done a great deal. Thanks to him we already have sites for the construction of 11,000 apartments near Vitebsk,

Pskov, and St. Petersburg. So there is a lack of mutual understanding now only with the Defense Ministry.

[Markaryan] How are relations with the local authorities taking shape?

[Kandalovskiy] We have not yet contacted the leadership of the Baltic states, but statements by some of them put us on our guard. Thus, Landsbergis declared recently: "Just as you were able to enter in the space of two days in 1940, so you are able to leave." As a military man, I say that if it seems to one of the leaders of such a rank that the district can withdraw in the space of two days, then he has absolutely no idea of what the district and the Army are like. If we are now set the task of withdrawing even in six months, this will mean that the republics will be committing hara-kiri for the sake of their own freedom. Because we will paralyze all the transport arteries to withdraw hundreds of thousands of tonnes of freight, shells, containers, and hardware. To prevent the republic's economy from being stifled, we need at least two years.

As for a possible blockade of the Army, the Baltic does not have a force capable of imposing it today. Why, anyhow? Who is against the republics now? The Latvian Supreme Council adopted the resolution "On the Take-over of Military Property." Did we respond by taking part in demonstrations or mounting pickets? No, although we are opposed to such a decision. But these are problems for the Latvian Parliament, while we turned to our own president and to Yakovlev.

[Markaryan] You can hardly surprise the Soviet person with anything any more, because unpredictable situations arise one after another. Could it not happen, in your view, that they will decide to sacrifice the Army tomorrow?

[Kandalovskiy] This is what we are most afraid of. Judging by the way our leadership is acting, we really are on the verge.... Our officers have noticed that the Defense Ministry Press Bureau issued information to the press that there is no plan for a troop withdrawal from the Baltic region at the Ministry of Defense. There really is not a withdrawal plan, there is a disbandment plan. This is more terrible. People will soon be thrown into the street. We have already received an instruction: In 1992 the divisions in Vilnius and Tallinn must cease to exist, as must the Dobeles Training Center.... There could be a social explosion if this problem is not resolved by normal means. The situation is already inflamed: At a recent officers' assembly they spent four hours out of six trying to persuade people that ultimatums and a show of force will lead to no good. But many no longer have anything to lose: No one here wants either passports or residence permits (no one is holding on to the Baltic region, and thousands are ready to leave even today, particularly when you hear yourself being called an "occupier" from all sides), and yet no one is waiting for us in Russia either.

[Markaryan] What is your attitude to predictions of a new attempt to seize power?

[Kandalovskiy] It is perfectly possible. The present disorder must be ended some time. But, believe me, it will not be the military that carries out a coup, if there is to be one. There are other forces that could seize power. The fact that these forces will endeavor to use the military is another matter.

If we do not resolve the problems in the district now, for example, a horde of people without apartments will pour into Russia. They are recruits who do not need to be canvassed. How are we to safeguard ourselves? Defend the rights of the specific person. There is no other way.

Tank Plants in Kharkov, Nizhniy Tagil Close

LD2411065591 Moscow Central Television First Program Network in Russian 2137 GMT 22 Nov 91

[Text] Within the process of conversion in the Soviet Union, production of tanks at two major works has been halted. This was announced by General Nelyubin, head of a directorate at the Ministry of Defense. A RUSSIAN INFORMATION AGENCY correspondent has managed to ascertain, from circles close to the USSR Supreme Soviet, that the works in question are at Kharkov and Nizhniy Tagil.

Lithuania Concerned Over Soviet Troops

Landsbergis Concerned Over New Units

OW2511172491 Moscow BALTFAX in English 1506 GMT 25 Nov 91

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Vytautas Landsbergis, chairman of the Supreme Council of Lithuania, spoke on Lithuanian television yesterday, claiming that armaments are still being transferred to new places within the republic and new units are being brought into it without the Lithuanian authorities being notified in advance.

Mr. Landsbergis expressed concern over the fact that the Soviet forces were not giving their property and weapons over to the Lithuanian authorities.

"We urgently need legislation which would make the transfer or sale of armaments by the Soviet forces to anyone else than the Lithuanian Government illegal," he said. He also remarked that extremely powerful weapons were disappearing in an unknown direction, though he gave no concrete facts to back up the claim.

According to Mr. Landsbergis, "It is not the accommodation problem that prevents the Soviet forces from pulling out of Lithuania but most likely plans to stage a new putsch."

Air Defense Unit at Ignalina Nuclear Plant

LD2511213891 Vilnius Radio Vilnius Network in Lithuanian 2000 GMT 25 Nov 91

[Text] Zigmas Vaisvila, deputy prime minister of the Republic of Lithuania, has sent a telegram to USSR Defense Minister Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov which reads: According to the information available to us, units of the USSR Defense Ministry surface-to-air missile forces which shield the Ignalina nuclear electric power station [AES] are getting ready for redeployment.

Bearing in mind the importance of ensuring the security of the installation, we request that the Armed Forces of the western region be redeployed only by a special agreement with the Government of the Republic of Lithuania.

We also draw your attention to the fact that the undefined status of the units of the Soviet Armed Forces deployed on the territory of the Republic of Lithuania is impeding the solution of social and everyday-life problems of the servicemen of the Soviet Armed Forces and of members of their families, especially as the deadline for making a decision on taking up citizenship of the Republic of Lithuania expired on 4 November 1991 and privatization started.

Therefore, the responsibility for dragging out the negotiations falls on the representatives of the Soviet Union and the officers of the Soviet Armed Forces living in Lithuania understand this. The Government of the Republic of Lithuania asks you to assist in speeding up the negotiations and setting up a corresponding agreement.

'Concrete Steps' on Withdrawal Urged

LD2911221491 Moscow TASS in English 2125 GMT 29 Nov 91

[By TASS correspondent Serafim Bykhun]

[Text] Vilnius November 29 TASS— "If the Soviet Union fails to take concrete steps to withdraw its troops from Lithuanian territory, the republic's leadership will have to act more decisively politically and diplomatically, as well as appeal to influential international organizations," the Lithuanian parliament's press attache Audrius Azubalis said.

He explained that his statement was prompted by the lack of practical response on the part of the Soviet Union to the statement of the Baltic Council which met in Vilnius on October 5.

The statement said among other things: "Before November 1, 1991 [date as received], the Soviet Union must liquidate army units, garrisons and bases of all arms in the capitals of the Baltic republics, as well as decide without delay on the withdrawal of Soviet Army troops from the territories of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia."

Envoy to Moscow on Withdrawal Talks*LD0512202891 Vilnius Radio Vilnius Network
in Lithuanian 0200 GMT 3 Dec 91*

[All Edidijus Bickauskas remarks recorded]

[Text] [Announcer] The Soviet Union's State Council recognized the independence of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia about three months ago. Later, President Mikhail Gorbachev appointed Eduard Shevardnadze head of the delegation for the negotiations with Lithuania. He later became the Soviet minister of external relations. But negotiations did not start, although there have been meetings of high-ranking officials of both sides.

In the opinion of Egidijus Bickauskas, the Lithuanian temporary charge d' affaires in Moscow, it is difficult to say when the negotiations between Lithuania and the Soviet Union will start.

[Bickauskas] I would say that the situation is not clear. The partner in our negotiations is not clear, the subjects with whom we should negotiate are not known, because so far they themselves have not decided what kind of Soviet Union there will be. There are many uncertainties. We start thinking, too. Maybe there will be a Soviet Union, or, may be, only Russia, which takes upon itself to pay the foreign debts. It even finances the Soviet Union's president and the Foreign Ministry. So far we even do not know the composition of the Soviet Union's delegation. Therefore we must wait until the situation is clear. As far as I understand, the same position of waiting has been taken up by the Soviet Union.

[Announcer] Recently, a Soviet diplomat, who wished to remain anonymous, told INTERFAX that Lithuania was not prepared for negotiations with the Soviet Union. This, he said, has become obvious during unofficial meetings. Egidijus Bickauskas stated that recently he heard the same Soviet assessment personally from an official close to Eduard Shevardnadze.

[Bickauskas] I am afraid he spoke too strongly, as there have been working meetings. But they have not been sufficiently fruitful because, as I already mentioned, the Soviet side was not decisive about the composition of the delegation. It has not even defined the object of the negotiations. They wanted to sit down immediately at the negotiations table; that is, for us to start the negotiations with an unknown partner. I am afraid the Soviet side wanted to fix the status of the army in Lithuania. This was not acceptable to us. I think this was the main obstacle to beginning the negotiations. I personally do not remember any statement on principle by the Soviet Union about the necessity to withdraw the Army. If they are prepared to withdraw the Army, we can start talking about the dates. I do not remember such a statement.

[Announcer] It was announced last week that according to a decree by President Gorbachev, the name of the Baltic Military District was changed to the Northwestern

Army Group. Although this decision by Moscow was not coordinated with the Baltic states, according to Egidijus Bickauskas, this means a small step in the relations between the states. According to international practice, the Soviet Army Group is usually not deployed in the capitals of states. In the opinion of Egidijus Bickauskas, it is difficult to tell whether Moscow is ready shortly to withdraw the Army from the capitals. On 2 December, Lithuania received a Soviet note stating that the Soviet Armed Forces are not planning exercises in 1992 and 1993, which should be announced in advance. With such a note, according to the Lithuanian diplomat, the Soviets are attempting to legalize their Army's status quo in Lithuania.

[Bickauskas] A large number of Soviet officials, including the military, have so far not realized that three truly independent states exist near to them. In my opinion, they only want satellite states near them. We must not forget that when we talk about the withdrawal of the Army, we talk not about the withdrawal of the Soviet Army, but about the withdrawal of the Russian Army. Lastly, this army will be withdrawn not to somewhere else, but to Russia. Therefore the question arises: Should we not start serious talks with the Russian leadership about this? I dare to say that essentially this a democratic Russian leadership, and we must not spoil our relations with them in the future.

[Announcer] According to Egidijus Bickauskas, the Lithuanian Embassy in Moscow maintains rather constructive diplomatic relations with the Soviet Ministry of External Relations. He said that shortly he expects to receive from this institution a reply to his letter, in which he asked how the Soviet Union intends to treat issues that are important to the Baltic states.

On 28 November, Lithuanian Deputy Prime Minister Zigmantas Vaisvila said in a television broadcast that the government had information about a possible coup in the Soviet Union sometime this week. The Lithuanian envoy in Moscow said that he did not have such information.

[Bickauskas] I do not wish to dispute what esteemed Zigmantas Vaisvila said; maybe he has more information than I, especially as far as Lithuania is concerned. I do not deny that such a coup can take place, but I do not think that it will take place so soon. I do not see any forces to carry out such a coup. But on the scale of the Soviet Union, I think that danger will be present somewhat later, in the second half of January or in February. And I do not connect this danger with some organization, but with a social explosion, when people, being tired—and they are very tired—may go to the streets, and riots and pogroms may start.

Latvian Officials on Progress of Soviet Troop Withdrawal

Defense Minister: Completion by 1993

LD2611122691 Moscow TASS in English 1147 GMT
26 Nov 91

[Text] Moscow November 26 TASS—1992 will be the year of mass Soviet troops pullout from Latvia, Talavs Jundzis, Latvian defense minister holds. He told the "NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA" today that the withdrawal should be completed by 1993.

Jundzis insists on a fast pullout, fearing tougher authorities may come to power in Moscow. "New leaders may emerge in the East who might change their attitude to Latvia," he claimed. "They won't speak with us as calmly, as the present-day leaders do," he added.

Soviet troops are "relatively quiet" in Latvia today, Jundzis said. But nobody can predict their behaviour if it does not "go smoothly in the East," he added.

Latvia is determined to take over the military facilities in the ice-free Baltic port of Liepaja, for which the minister will petition during his upcoming talks with Russia and the Soviet Union.

Latvia will also have its own services guarding land, water and air borders. The republic will create several mobile fast reaction battalions and civil volunteer corps, the minister said.

Defense Adviser Comments

OW0212204591 Moscow BALTFAX in English
1930 GMT 2 Dec 91

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Eriks Tilgass, adviser to the Latvian Government for defense affairs, has told BF [BALTFAX] that the Soviet military have already abandoned 2 buildings in Riga: one is the Officers' House of the former Baltic Military District and the other belonged to the district's headquarters (before WW2 it housed the German Embassy). Currently, the question of transferring the district's museum building to the Latvian Culture Ministry is under discussion.

The USSR Interior Ministry convoy regiment which have guarded Latvian prisons is to leave Riga by January 1st, 1992. According to Mr. Tilgass, the military contingent is also being reduced at training centers in Adazi where the headquarters of the North-Western group (former Baltic Military District) is to move from Riga. Soviet troops have already given up the training bases at Varne near Ventspils and in the Liepae region to Latvian border guards.

Eriks Tilgass also said that in the near future a governmental commission would be set up to control the withdrawal of troops from Latvia and to receive facilities

left by the Soviet Army. Latvian State Minister Janis Dinevics is expected to head the commission.

Ukraine Wants To Participate in CSCE Talks

OW0112083991 Moscow INTERFAX in English
2026 GMT 29 Nov 91

["Diplomatic Panorama" feature from reports by diplomatic correspondents Mikhail Mayorov and Igor Porshnev: "The Ukraine Lays a Claim To Being an Independent Subject of International Law"; transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The Ukraine has expressed support for the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe signed by the USSR and other participants in the Helsinki process. But the statement to this effect made by the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the republic makes it clear that in future the Ukraine expects to take direct part in negotiations on control over conventional armaments and in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe [CSCE].

The document also states that, as one of the former parts of the USSR, the Ukraine deems it necessary to observe all the requirements of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces which apply to all forces stationed on its territory, including the provisions for inspection procedures. "The treaty does apply to the Ukrainian armed forces," the statement emphasises.

Some experts believe the Ukraine thereby confirms its intention to possess its own armed forces and subsequently act on the world arena on its own, without pooling efforts with any of the other sovereign republics. The statement refers to the Ukrainian armed forces as something which already exists. This contradicts the State Council decisions to the effect that the republics forming the USSR should have joint armed forces and constitute a single strategic area.

According to information received from the USSR Presidential staff on November 28, Mikhail Gorbachev is very worried by the USA's apparent readiness to recognise the independence of the Ukraine if it gets a majority vote during the referendum next Sunday [1 December]. But, since nobody in the Ukraine or elsewhere has any doubts that this is what will happen, the Ukraine is laying a claim to being an independent subject of international law even now.

Delay in CFE Treaty Ratification Viewed

PM0312164991 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
3 Dec 91 Union Edition p 4

[G. Deynichenko article: "No Credit Without Confidence. Delay Over Ratifying Paris Treaty Worries Our Partners"]

[Text] The Senate of the U.S. Congress has approved a resolution ratifying the Treaty on Conventional Armed

Forces in Europe. Neither the treaty itself nor its ratification elicited any particular objections from the senators. Noting the importance of this agreement for strengthening the system of international security and reducing the threat of armed conflict in Europe, the senators voted in concert (90 "for," four "against") in favor of its approval.

The treaty was signed in Paris just over a year ago—19 November—by the leaders of the NATO countries and the Warsaw Pact Organization, which still existed then, and was at once called unique. This description is fair not only because the Paris treaty is the first multilateral agreement in history in the sphere of conventional armed forces. It provides for the real physical and strictly verified destruction of a vast quantity of tanks, armored vehicles, artillery pieces, and combat aircraft on the European continent—a region oversaturated with military hardware to a dangerous degree.

The stormy development of events in Europe has resulted in striking changes in the geopolitical situation, whose purport boils down to a sharp reduction in the former military confrontation. The threat from the East no longer exists. But the disappearance of this threat certainly does not diminish the significance of the Paris treaty. Moreover, the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact, the serious political and economic troubles in the east of the continent, and the inveterate ethnic and territorial disputes have resulted in the emergence of new destabilizing factors. The realization of the Arms Reduction Treaty under these conditions would be doing a good service to the cause of strengthening security and tranquillity and would open up ways to the more efficient development of economic ties over vast expanses—from the Atlantic to the Urals.

None of this requires any particular proof. But the Paris treaty has not yet come into force because it has not been ratified by all the participants—chiefly our country, which, if you recall history, campaigned more than anyone for disarmament.

How do things stand with the ratification of the Paris treaty in Moscow? A corresponding proposal was put to the USSR Supreme Soviet last spring, and after a joint examination by the international and defense committees the Paris treaty was recommended for ratification at a plenary session of the Supreme Soviet.

But then things came to a standstill. Time was lost, and now neither that Supreme Soviet nor the former Soviet Union exists any longer. The present Soviet of the Republics, which is responsible for examining international enactments, is not working with a full complement, and is thus lacking the necessary quorum. Moreover, not particularly considering itself bound by the rules of succession, the Soviet of the Republics is inclined to conduct anew in its own international and defense committees the whole procedure of the Paris treaty's preliminary discussion. When will all this

happen? There have not yet been any decisions, and no work plan exists in the Soviet of the Republics.

Objective difficulties? Yes, if you like. It is possible to understand the deputies. They are certainly not inspired either by the delay in the Novo-Ogarevo process or by the sovereign republics' military pretensions. How, in fact, are we to vote for a reduction in tanks or artillery pieces if the republics proclaim them their own property? Problems of a juridical and political nature requiring urgent consideration really do arise here.

Incidentally, when discussing the Paris treaty, the U.S. senators showed valid concern as to whether its provisions will be observed by the Soviet republics located in Europe which have proclaimed their sovereignty. As a result, the Senate resolution includes a provision obliging the U.S. Administration to take all the measures provided for by the treaty if new independent states emerge on the political map of Europe.

Be that as it may, the Paris treaty has not been ratified on our part, and this does not add either to our good name or to confidence, for which we all have an extremely great need not only for the sake of our international prestige but also for the sake of simple survival. For it is known that there is no credit without confidence. And we probably need arms reduction more than others do—in the interests of our own tranquillity and of peace and security in our land.

The ratification of the Paris treaty becomes increasingly urgent as time passes, and I would not like things to reach the point of no return.

Cabinet Concerned Over Soviet Troops Presence

*OW0712192291 Moscow BALTFAX in English
1700 GMT 7 Dec 91*

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The press service of the Coordinating Bureau preparing negotiations between Estonia and the USSR has made public a statement by the Estonian Cabinet expressing concern over the continued presence of Soviet troops in the republic and non-observance by the Soviet side of some of Estonia's agreements with the USSR Defense Ministry. The Estonian Government warns that in this unstable situation some of the military units stationed in the Baltics may go out of Moscow's control.

The authors express regret that Soviet-Estonian talks are still indefinitely delayed. Unless they open at an early date, Estonia may be compelled to appeal to the international public to explain how dangerous the situation is, the statement says. "Hopefully, the USSR will do its best for the talks to get under way soon," the Estonian Cabinet's statement says.

NUCLEAR TESTING

Effects of Semipalatinsk Nuclear Tests Studied

*LD2111132791 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 1636 GMT 20 Nov 91*

[By TASS correspondent Valentin Pavlov]

[Text] Barnaul, 20 Nov (TASS)—From 1949, the population of the territories adjacent to the Semipalatinsk proving ground was subjected to radiation during surface nuclear explosions. This was established by the government commission created by Boris Yeltsin, president of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic, to establish the consequences of nuclear tests. Today the commission finished its work in Altay Kray and the Gorno-Altay Soviet Socialist Republic. And although presently there is no danger of nuclear contamination, in a number of rayons people still suffer from ill health due to the consequences of the tests.

A member of the commission, Yakov Shoykhest, who is prorektor of scientific work at the Altay Medical Institute, told the TASS correspondent that "having studied the materials submitted by the proving ground and by 34 scientific organizations of the country, the commission came to the conclusion that the population of the kray needed a whole range of socioeconomic protection measures in order to eliminate the consequences of nuclear tests on the Semipalatinsk proving ground. The commission has also accepted that some of the territory of the kray had suffered ruinous effects from the nuclear tests. Some of its inhabitants were subjected to the effects of radiation. Any unfavorable factor of the present environment, especially heavy metals, may affect the victims decades later."

Nevertheless, Yakov Shoykhest underlined that presently there was no danger. He continued, saying that "the goal is to continue a more detailed analysis of the consequences of the tests, to carry out the improvements of health services for the population, and to propose a complex of measures for socioeconomic development of the territories situated in the former zone affected by nuclear tests."

Today the members of the government commission left Barnaul for Orenburg Oblast, which had also suffered from nuclear tests.

Yakut Region Declares Ban on Nuclear Activity

*PM2511155391 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 22 Nov 91 First Edition p 7*

[Correspondent Nikolay Bely report: "Yakutia Is a Nuclear-Free Zone"]

[Text] Only recently has the secret of the Land of the Soviets' third nuclear test range (apart from Semipalatinsk and Zapolyarnyy on Novaya Zemlya) been

revealed. It operated in the high latitudes of Yakutia. Twelve nuclear explosions were staged there.

A session of the Yakutia parliament recently passed a resolution declaring Russia's largest republic a nuclear-free zone. Henceforth the production, siting, storage, and testing of nuclear weapons and their components, the use of nuclear weapons for peaceful purposes, the development of fissionable material, and the manufacture of radioactive products there are banned.

Underground Test in Kuzbass Revealed

*92P50064A Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA
in Russian 13 Dec 91 p 2*

[Anatoliy Parshintsev report: "Nuclear Explosion in Kuzbass"]

[Text] A few years ago the residents of Kemerovo were rather shaken. An earthquake in a seismologically quiet region was registered in Novosibirsk. But there was something strange: The then-competent organs for some reason forbade the sensational information to be published in the newspapers.

The truth came out only today, thanks to the persistence of RSFSR Deputy V. Balovnev. It turns out that a powerful underground nuclear explosion to the north of the Kuzbass caused the earth to shake.

CHEMICAL & BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

Spokesman on Possible Explosive Destruction of CW

*LD2011174591 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 1521 GMT 20 Nov 91*

[By TASS diplomatic correspondent Sergey Staroselskiy]

[Excerpts] Moscow, 20 Nov (TASS)—Today's briefing at the USSR Foreign Ministry was almost entirely about the appointment of Eduard Shevardnadze to the post of minister of external relations. Vitaliy Churkin, head of the Information Department, started the briefing by talking about a session of the Foreign Ministry Collegium. [passage omitted]

Journalists were also interested in a statement by Vitaliy Churkin in connection with reports that have appeared to the effect that a private company recently set up in the Soviet Union is offering foreign partners services in eliminating weapons of mass destruction, in particular chemical weapons [CW], by the method of underground nuclear explosion.

Such operations, he explained, cannot be carried out without the permission of the competent state organs. According to the information we possess, the corresponding question has not been examined by these organs, and they have not given permission for conducting a nuclear explosion on the territory of the

country. Apart from that, Vitaliy Churkin stressed, the USSR adheres to a year-long moratorium on nuclear explosions introduced by the president. We know that the country's scientific research establishments are conducting theoretical research regarding the most effective and ecologically reliable methods of eliminating weapons of mass destruction, including by means of nuclear explosions, he concluded.

Former KGB Aide on 1979 Sverdlovsk Anthrax

924P0040A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 25 Nov 91
Union Edition p 4

[Article by IZVESTIYA correspondent A. Pashkov: "'I Know Where the Anthrax in Sverdlovsk Came From,' a Former Counterintelligence General Informed the Editorial Office"]

[Text] Ekaterinburg-Moscow-Dnepropetrovsk—An explanation of the circumstances of the anthrax outbreak in Sverdlovsk in 1979 led to Moscow in 1991. It is here, according to IZVESTIYA data, that people who have a direct relationship to the investigation of the circumstances of the bygone tragedy live and work. Interviews held in the capital add a lot to the paragraphs already published in IZVESTIYA about the 1979 Sverdlovsk events (No. 268).

"May the state system with its heartless attitude toward the individual be thrice-cursed," V. Pirozhkov, former deputy chairman of the USSR KGB and now a pensioner, said to me angrily. "You see, to this very day no kind of material assistance has been given to the families of people who died from the anthrax. Although Andropov gave instructions that appropriate documents be prepared..."

To tell the truth, neither the government nor the CPSU reacted officially to the tragedy that took place in Sverdlovsk. People came to me who suffered at that time and who remain miraculously alive. The state turned away from them completely. True, after first getting their signatures about not publicizing what happened to them.

...The fate of driver A. Zhelnin is typical. On 4 April he, like all the workers at the 19th secret military compound, went through a clinical examination, but within a day he was taken to the hospital with all the symptoms of anthrax.

...Five persons from that compound underwent intensive treatment and pulled through. But to this day, military doctors have recorded various diagnoses for their ailments except the true one, in order to sweep all trace of the truth away. And this is natural because, as previously, everything is being done to maintain the 19th compound above suspicion.

And so V. Pirozhkov, complaining about the callousness of that system which he guarded vigilantly, for which, incidentally, he received a substantial amount of money

by Soviet standards, speaks very sparingly about the causes of the origin of the illness:

"At that time we sent a note to the government signed by USSR Minister of Health Petrovskiy, chief medical doctor of the country Burgasov, and myself. Try to find it. Well, this note is not in the KGB—the Union procuracy took it a year ago..."

I did not spend any time searching. After all, the note laid out the "meaty" version, which was widely known even without the note. But Vladimir Petrovich Pirozhkov, although he was sorry for those who perished, did not breathe a word about other notes and cipher communications which at that time were pouring most of all into the party and "competent organs." Once a Chekist, always a Chekist: Secrets have to be protected. Forever! Nonetheless, the former deputy chairman advised me to meet with Academician Burgasov. To obtain information, so to say, firsthand.

A long interview with Petr Nikolayevich took place in his apartment in the famous tall house on Kotelnicheskaya Naberezhnaya. Muscovites call it the KGB house, apparently because of the professional affiliations of some of the tenants. Academician Burgasov is also a person who wears shoulder boards, but of a different kind—he began and later worked a long time in military medicine.

The material gathered prior to this meeting indicates that Academician Burgasov never even appeared on the territory of the military compound after the events of 1979. According to one version, because he did not want to be under foreign travel restrictions. As it turned out, however, there was another reason.

From 1958 to 1963, P. Burgasov worked in the compound on classified subjects, and what was being done there was no secret to him. Also of no small importance is the fact that General I. Smirnov, who came to Sverdlovsk and who was in charge of the Ministry of Defense bacteriological laboratory, was his immediate chief at one time, and they parted, judging by everything, in a not very friendly way. Thus, in the words of the academician, any excessive attention to this facility on the part of the chief medical doctor of the country could be viewed as intrigue and an attempt to undermine. However, Burgasov nonetheless showed "adherence to principles": He took samples from the sewer flow, in which, it is true, nothing was found.

Burgasov's main argument in favor of the official version at that time was the fact that the Americans began to work on anthrax earlier than us, knew everything about it, and would be able to immediately detect any suspicious fact.

"After world public opinion was aroused by rumors of the Ural bacteriological weapon, we departed for America with documents and facts," recounts Petr Nikolayevich, "Believe me, we literally were turned inside out, and leading specialists with world-famous names

agreed with the 'meaty' version. I even had an opportunity to talk with one individual from the CIA, who said that they would not overlook the possibility of using the 'Sverdlovsk' opportunity to increase appropriations for their own bacteriological weapon."

Well, it was possible to deceive world public opinion. Or did it for some reason decide to deceive itself? Although, as it became clear, American intelligence officers under all kinds of "cover" visited Sverdlovsk at that time. They got out of trains and talked with the people. They were in Kurgan and Shadrinsk—in cities situated close to Sverdlovsk Oblast in the direction of the wind from the 19th compound. But, as I was assured by former counterintelligence officer A. Mironyuk, the spies talked as a rule with those whom in the opinion of the KGB it was necessary to talk to support the official version.

It is an appropriate time now to acquaint the reader with the story of retired general A. Mironyuk, who in April 1979 was performing duty as chief of the special department of the Ural Military District.

"Things went well" in the career of Andrey Yakovlevich. He frequently was assigned to hot spots around the world. In 1962 he was sent to Cuba from Leningrad as part of a military group in civilian clothing. This is the way the "training brigade" that is being withdrawn today from the island of freedom was formed. In 1968 Mironyuk, as part of a Pskov airborne assault division, was awaiting orders to land in Czechoslovakia. Within a year there were the Chinese events. Afterward, Sverdlovsk. The last place he served was Chernobyl.

After the general sent information to the KGB central organs about the eyewash engaged in by the military leadership responsible for cleaning up the Chernobyl area, the people in Moscow began to be seriously concerned for his health.

To cut a long story short, Mironyuk is now retired and engaged in commercial activity in Dnepropetrovsk. He headed a union of cooperatives, he is a founding member of a commodity exchange, and he is engaged in banking matters. He left the party in 1987. Economic independence and an unwillingness to lie to himself any more, or to people, served as the incentive for the former counterintelligence officer to speak out.

"At the beginning of April I began receiving reports that several soldiers and officers of the reserve who went through periodic training in the 32d military compound had died," said A. Mironyuk. "We worked on various alternatives for about two weeks: cattle, food, raw materials for the plant, and so forth. I asked the chief of the 19th compound, which is situated next to the 32d and where there was a military laboratory, for a wind direction map of the winds that blew from the direction of the facility on those days. They gave it to me. I decided to verify this data, and requested similar information at Koltsovo airport. Fundamental differences emerged. Then operational groups were established, which took the following action: They queried the relatives of the

deceased in detail, literally by the hour and the minute, and, with a specific tie to the locality, they marked on the map the places in which the perished were located. At a specific time—around 0700-0800—they all turned up in the zone of the wind from the 19th compound."

"I turned the map over to Pirozhkov," continued Mironyuk, "and he immediately flew to Moscow. I recall that for some reason he asked to cut off the inscription 'special department' from the edge of the map. Later, people from the KGB connected their own equipment to the official offices of the laboratories, and we found out the truth. Someone from the laboratory (the name was mentioned, but I simply do not remember it) arrived early in the morning and began to work without turning on safety filters and other protective mechanisms. A discharge occurred. Its victims were those who hurried to the assembly early in the morning, those who came out on the balcony, those who were on the street, and so forth.

"Well, but if Academician Burgasov claims that this could not have happened, because there were a lot of deaths and people died over the course of two months, it is difficult for me to argue. We discussed this situation in our circle and concluded that the pathogens could have fallen on clothes and other objects, and then transferred to other people. Preventive measures were taken immediately in the compound itself and in the neighboring compound. It should not be forgotten that animals got sick at the same time—a chain reaction was started.

"It was the task of the scientists to decide: Was it a bacteriological weapon or something else again. But we knew precisely that the military laboratory was the source of the contagion. And its leaders tried to conceal this fact. Only after they were pinned to the wall did the specialists confess. It was then that an entire program to disinform the public in the country and the world was developed. Mail, communications, and the press were taken under control. They worked with foreign intelligence. I do not know whether Academician Burgasov was informed, but he performed his part of the 'program' in an outstanding way.

"Incidentally, there was talk about the withdrawal of hospital cards. And, I think, the oblast KGB administration received pertinent instructions," concludes A. Mironyuk. "Afterwards, I was still working in Sverdlovsk, and I know that the laboratory was sent on several Tupolev aircraft to the environs of Irkutsk. Within a year I received a telephone call and was ordered to burn all documents. Naturally, I carried out the order at that time."

I think that there is no need to comment on the general's story: There are no literary words that can convey the terrifying idea expressed by him. Dozens of people perished, and we still do not even know the name of the person who "did something incorrectly." We do not know what the scientists in "shoulder boards" were

engaged in and what sort of "plague" was being cultivated behind the barbed wire. Lies and hypocrisy have long since become a vital activity of our state. What is most terrible is that those who created the disinformation program think that they were serving the country, you and me...

Academician Burgasov expressed an interesting idea. Like the Americans, we are convinced that we are not creating weapons of attack. But in order to create a defense system it is necessary to test its strength precisely with an attack. And so we tested...

Irkutsk Deputy Seeks Data on Alleged Biological Weapons Lab

92WN0174A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 6 Dec 91
Union Edition p 7

[Article by V. Sbitnev, IZVESTIYA staff correspondent: "Anthrax Being Sought in Siberia"]

[Text] Mention in IZVESTIYA (No 279) of the fact that a secret bacteriological weapons development laboratory had been relocated to a site near Irkutsk has alarmed Siberians.

Immediately after publication of a correspondent's report entitled: "I Know Where the Anthrax in Sverdlovsk Came From," Yu. Shevelev, a people's deputy in the Irkutsk city and oblast soviets, asked the oblast Federal Security Administration (FSA) Administration to clarify the matter.

A few days later he received an exhaustive reply which stated that "no information regarding the relocation of the laboratory to the vicinity of Irkutsk or its location anywhere within the territory of the oblast has been uncovered." True, the reply contained the caveats that, firstly, the FSA did not have the information which was of interest to the oblast population at its disposal and, secondly, Yu. Shevelev was advised "for the sake of clarity regarding this important matter" to send a deputy's inquiry to the USSR and RSFSR ministries of defense, as well as to the Russian Government.

Those disclaimers prompted the city's leaders to have serious doubts about the sincerity of the reply. At its latest session the Irkutsk Gorispolkom [city soviet executive committee] created a commission specially authorized to verify the report printed in our newspaper. The commission members include both deputies and representatives of the ispolkom. Professor M. Savchenkov, deputy chairman of the East Siberian Division of the Academy of Medical Sciences (Siberian Branch), was asked to head up the investigation. The authorities assume the medical personnel will have better luck than the intelligence officers did.

NUCLEAR-FREE ZONES & PEACE ZONES

Commentator on Possible ROK Nuclear-Free Zone

SK2111050491 Moscow Radio Moscow in Korean
1100 GMT 19 Nov 91

[By station commentator Alekseyev from the "Focus on Asia" program]

[Text] On 20 November U.S. Secretary of Defense Cheney will meet with ROK Defense Minister Yi Chong-ku in Seoul to discuss security.

Station commentator Alekseyev writes:

According to SEOUL SINMUN and CHOSON ILBO, the immediate agenda has been finalized.

Seoul is expected to raise the question of arming the (?army units numbering 39,000) with ultramodern U.S. war equipment, like Patriot antimissile missiles and Tomahawk missiles.

As has been reported by CHOSON ILBO, the ROK will also try to get (?approval) from Washington on its plan to establish [word indistinct] for its own missile system with a range of 180 km. The upcoming U.S.-ROK negotiation, however, is not expected to come out this way.

The question stems from the fact that U.S. and ROK defense ministers are expected to discuss the procedures of withdrawing U.S. nuclear weapons from the ROK. In addition, Seoul believes that the nuclear weapons will be removed as soon as possible, according to the ROK defense minister.

Judging from all the facts, the ROK will be turned into a nuclear-free zone in the near future. Thus, important measures will be taken to achieve Pyongyang's long-standing plan for denuclearizing the Korean peninsula. However, this will take more than a guarantee from Seoul.

The international community expresses sincere concern about Pyongyang's refusal to open its nuclear facilities to international inspection. The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty Pyongyang has signed requires that the signatory place its nuclear facilities under international inspection.

An exaggerated rumor that North Korea is developing nuclear weapons is being spread. Once U.S. nuclear weapons begin to be removed from the ROK, Pyongyang will be in a strong position, because U.S. nuclear weapons deployed in the ROK have given Pyongyang an excuse to refuse any international inspections of its nuclear facilities.

Denuclearization of Korean Peninsula Discussed

U.S., ROK Statements Cited

SK0212114591 Moscow Radio Moscow in Korean
1100 GMT 1 Dec 91

[By TASS reporter (Vladimir Sontsov); from the "Focus on Asia" program]

[Text] TASS reporter (Vladimir Sontsov) examines the possibility of turning the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free zone.

The United States began withdrawing its tactical nuclear weapons from the ROK last week, reported YONHAP News Agency, quoting an ROK Government source.

Following its policy of neither confirming nor denying the presence of nuclear weapons, according to a spokesman for the Seoul administration [haengjongbu] who wanted to remain anonymous, the United States has not given the exact date it will start withdrawing the nuclear weapons. However, he said he was certain that the withdrawal of U.S. nuclear weapons from the ROK has really begun.

According to testimony by U.S. experts, the United States currently has about 100 tactical nuclear weapons in the ROK. These nuclear weapons, such as bombs and shells, are deployed at an Air Force base in Kunsan, southwest of Seoul.

In addition, the United States has two batteries of Lance missiles and 24 pursuit-fighters capable of carrying nuclear weapons in the ROK, according to the press.

The withdrawal of U.S. nuclear weapons from the ROK is in step with U.S. President Bush's proposal for a drastic reduction of tactical nuclear weapons announced last September and ROK President No Tae-u's announcement of his will to turn the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free zone declared on 8 November.

According to press reports, Washington and Seoul have agreed to complete the withdrawal of U.S. nuclear weapons from the ROK before the end of this year.

According to ROK delegates, the possibility of the United States withdrawing its nuclear weapons from the ROK, as was expected, has taken into consideration the conspicuous changes that may take place in the North Korean position, which is believed to be capable of developing its own nuclear weapons soon.

Until recently, Pyongyang had adamantly refused to agree to international inspections of its nuclear weapons until the United States has completely withdrawn its nuclear weapons from the ROK.

In a statement released on 25 November, the DPRK Foreign Ministry expressed its willingness to sign the nuclear safeguards accord with the International Atomic

Energy Agency when the United States begins withdrawing its nuclear weapons from the ROK, acknowledging such a development.

The source in the ROK quoted by YONHAP said that if Pyongyang opens up its nuclear facilities for inspection by the international body, Seoul may agree to inspections of the U.S. military facilities in the ROK as part of a confidence-building measure.

The possibility of turning the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free zone has now become practical.

DPRK Stance Viewed

PM0212164991 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
2 Dec 91 Union Edition p 3

[G. Stepanov article: "North Korea's Nuclear Program. In the Opinion of U.S. Experts, Pyongyang Is Very Close to Developing a Nuclear Weapon"]

[Text] Is North Korea developing [sozdayet] its own atom bomb? The Americans are convinced that Pyongyang's work on nuclear weapons is now at its final stage, and they are insistently demanding that international inspections be held. All the indications are that the Soviet Union, which for many years shielded its ideological ally from the "unsubstantiated accusations" of the West, is today changing its approach.

The peninsula is a conflict point not just in Southeast Asia but in world terms too. A major factor affecting the situation in the region is the American nuclear weapons stationed in the south of the peninsula after the Korean War. The United States has itself never admitted the existence of the weapons, guided by the principle of "neither confirming nor denying." "The U.S. nuclear weapons in South Korea are tactical weapons and are regarded by the Americans as an instrument for deterrence and at the same time pressure on North Korea. But there cannot be a nuclear war on the Korean peninsula, of course," Yuriy Fadeyev, deputy chief of the Ministry of External Relations Far East and Indochina Administration, believes.

The topic of Pyongyang's nuclear ambitions is the focus of attention of Western mass media and U.S. officials. Secretary of State James Baker called the DPRK's nuclear program "an extremely serious threat to security and stability in Asia." U.S. Defense Secretary Richard Cheney called it "the main source of instability in Southeast Asia." A plutonium processing plant suitable for manufacturing nuclear warheads is currently under construction and could start operating as early as next year, he said.

But nonetheless, at present there is no incontrovertible evidence backed up by documentary confirmation that North Korea is working to develop its own atom bomb. A significant proportion of the information that the Americans possess consists of photographs taken from the air.

Six years ago the DPRK signed the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, but it is still refusing to allow the international inspections stipulated by this document to be carried out on its territory. "As far as I know," Yu. Fadeyev says, "there are nuclear installations in the DPRK which Pyongyang is trying to keep secret. When there has been a five-year delay in signing the verification [kontrolnyy] agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA], the question arises—is North Korea's nuclear activity going beyond the bounds of scientific research and industrial purposes. Although we cannot fail to take note of Pyongyang's official statement at the highest level that the DPRK "has neither the intention nor the potential to develop nuclear weapons."

On 25 November the North Korean Foreign Ministry unexpectedly announced that it will sign an agreement allowing international inspection of its nuclear installations if the withdrawal of U.S. nuclear munitions from the south of the peninsula begins (the United States had already made this decision and has embarked on implementing it). Moreover, the statement includes a proposal for simultaneous inspections of the sites where U.S. nuclear weapons are stationed in South Korea and "nuclear installations" in North Korea and for holding talks between Pyongyang and Washington on eliminating the "nuclear threat" to the DPRK. North Korea invites Seoul to discuss the question of establishing a nuclear-free zone on the Korean peninsula and renouncing the development of nuclear weapons.

"The second point in the DPRK Foreign Ministry statement," Yu. Fadeyev explains, "envisages carrying out simultaneous inspections in North and South Korea. There is not a word about inspecting military installations. IAEA monitoring of peaceful nuclear installations in the south has been going on for a long time—ever since South Korea signed the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons. While proposing to send inspectors to military bases in the south of the peninsula, Pyongyang at the same time says nothing about allowing them into its own military installations. Serious differences of opinion between the North and the South are possible on this point: No Tae-u will obviously be prepared to accept verification of both military and peaceful installations, but only on an equal basis. And the second point does not offer this sort of parity."

In Moscow's opinion, the establishment of a nuclear-free zone would be a radical solution to the problems of the Korean peninsula. Our country is prepared to be the guarantor of Korea's nuclear-free status. The Soviet side has always tried to persuade the Americans that strong-arm diplomacy against the DPRK is unproductive and has called for nuclear weapons to be withdrawn from South Korea. But Moscow has also tried to lean on Pyongyang to sign the international inspections agreement. After all, if we are to believe the statement that the DPRK Government made in 1986, Pyongyang renounces the production and siting of nuclear weapons in the country. So it has nothing to fear.

ASIAN SECURITY ISSUES

Far East Commander on Kurils Withdrawal

*PM2211102191 Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 19 Nov 91 First Edition p 1*

[By unidentified correspondent under the "Direct Line" rubric: "What the Commanding General Said to PRIAMURSKIYE VEDOMOSTI"]

[Text] Khabarovsk—KRSNAYA ZVEZDA published an item 13 November entitled "Soviet Troops Will Leave South Kurils," which the editorial office received through the RUSSIAN INFORMATION AGENCY. It stated that the withdrawal of troops stationed on islands in the Kuril chain will begin this year. The RIA correspondent reported that this had been declared by the commander of the Far East Military District, Colonel General V. Novozhilov, in an interview with the newspaper PRIAMURSKIYE VEDOMOSTI [Amur Record].

It has emerged that there was some inaccuracy here. In answer to questions from the PRIAMURSKIYE VEDOMOSTI correspondent, the commanding officer said in particular that this question is being studied in Moscow right now. Viktor Ivanovich suggested: I think that we will receive an order on the partial withdrawal of servicemen from islands in the South Kuril chain before the New Year.

As for complete troop withdrawal, the commander noted in conclusion, I am wholly in favor of this. I have already submitted such a proposal to the Union Ministry of Defense. It envisages at the same time a certain increase in the strength of border guards to protect our territory. If Moscow supports us, the region will, first, have greater confidence in the country and, second, we will be able to save a large amount of money which will be spent on supporting the personnel billeted on the islands and ensuring food supplies for them.

Sino-Soviet Border Troop Reduction Talks Reported

*LD0212183191 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 1615 GMT 2 Dec 91*

[Text] Moscow, 2 Dec (TASS)—Component elements in armed forces reductions, geographical limits on the application of a general agreement, the exchange of initial data, and monitoring and confidence-building measures were discussed during the fifth round of Soviet-Chinese talks on the mutual reduction of armed forces and strengthening confidence in the military sphere around the Soviet-Chinese border, the Information Directorate of the USSR Ministry for External Relations reported today. The negotiations were held in Moscow from 11 November to 2 December. Discussion was held on the basis of drafts of a general agreement which have been presented by the Chinese and Soviet sides. The sides agreed to hold the next round of talks in Beijing in the spring of 1992.

REPUBLIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS ISSUES

Ukrainian, Kazakh Nuclear Arms Stance Scored

PM2011102091 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 15 Nov 91 pp 1-2

[Vladimir Kuznechevskiy commentary: "You Want Nuclear Weapons? Take them. But Pay for Them Yourself"]

[Text] If anything is worrying the West regarding events in the USSR right now, it is the fate of nuclear weapons in the former Union.

Understanding the West's concerns over its security, Gorbachev and Yeltsin promoted an initiative: first, to bring all nuclear weapons onto RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] territory with a view to destroying superfluous stocks of these weapons; and second, to preserve strict central control over them.

It seems, however, that not everybody in those republics which have nuclear weapons on their territory fully understands the West's concern and why Gorbachev and Yeltsin adopted such a stance. Obviously, certain national leaders' excessively speedy rise to the highest republic positions, whereby the development of political muscle somewhat outstripped that of political wisdom, had an impact on this. Precociousness [akseleratsiya] is an insidious thing. In life, maybe, it prompts a smile, but in politics it prompts quite a different feeling—fear.

In the pre-putsch days the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet declared the territory of its republic a nuclear-free zone. The declaration was made at a time when the republic Supreme Soviet could never have imagined that the time would come when it could control the nuclear weapons on its territory. To all appearances, that is why it took this decision at that moment: If we cannot control these weapons, we will remove them from our territory altogether and let Moscow, not us, worry about them, but the situation changed radically. The putsch came and went, and immediately afterward—as if to pursue and blame the Moscow putschists for its own weakness during that 48 hours—the Ukrainian leadership declared the republic fully independent and no longer part of any political USSR-style alliance with Moscow. Here the question of nuclear weapons arose once again. The Ukraine decided not to transfer them to Russia. At a recent news conference in Paris, Ukrainian Supreme Soviet Chairman L. Kravchuk declared that neither strategic nor tactical nuclear weapons must remain in the Ukraine, but will not be transferred to Russia; they will be destroyed in the Ukraine. After this, the Ukrainian leadership declared on several occasions that it is taking command of the troops from all three military districts stationed on Ukrainian territory (Kiev, Odessa, and Carpathian Districts) as well as the Black Sea Fleet. The composition of these forces includes 176 nuclear missile silos containing strategic missiles; aircraft carriers

belonging to the Black Sea Fleet; Akula-class attack submarines armed with tactical nuclear weapons, etc.

So why this drastic change of position? Basically it seems that the reason lies in playing for higher stakes in the matter of the republic's international prestige. The current republic leaders are dreaming: They see themselves at the head of a mighty international power recognized by the entire international community and at the very least alongside Russia. After his recent visit to Canada, the United States, and France, Kravchuk declared with naive simplicity: "The world is waiting for an independent Ukrainian state to appear on the map." In fact, this also derives from the sphere of precociousness in the political field. If it is waiting for anything at all, the international community is most probably not waiting for an independent Ukraine or Tatarstan, Lithuania or Moldova to appear on the map, but for stability on former USSR territory and reliable control over the Soviet Union's military monster to be established as quickly as possible. Some people have the urge to become leaders of a great power in the world arena without delay, but how? They have no brand name product, and no intellectual and political potential with which to enter the world market right now. So by declaring oneself master of the nuclear capability on one's own territory, recognition will then be forthcoming, and not only Gorbachev and Yeltsin will be present at talks on disarmament with the greats of this world, but also Kravchuk and Nazarbayev.

Of course, it is not a simple question. Kravchuk is not the only one to have changed his view of it on more than one occasion, Nazarbayev has done so too, shifting from a total rejection of nuclear weapons to claims to control over them and a refusal to transfer them to the RSFSR. We—the ordinary citizens—also hold mixed views of the situation. Naturally, for any Russian the initial reaction to nationalizing the Black Sea Fleet or the Baykonur Space Center is a negative one. After all, it is clear that neither the Ukraine nor Kazakhstan has the moral right to such unilateral action in the same way as neither Kiev nor Alma-Ata was empowered to set up such complexes as the Black Sea Fleet or Baykonur on their own. Of course, the Ukraine and Kazakhstan do have some claim over these things, but then so do other republics, not least Russia. Nazarbayev announced 6 October that the successor to the USSR could not be any one republic alone, thinking here about the nationalization of certain real estate in Moscow. No doubt he is right when he says that something created by all the people is everybody's heritage. In doing so, however, he forgets to point out that it is everybody's only in proportion to the size of the contribution to this common heritage. Indeed, it cannot be expected that if somebody builds a house and his partner fits the window frames then both parties' rights to the entire house are absolutely identical.

Actually, this is not the problem. Instead, it is the fact that neither Russia nor the other republics need nuclear weapons in the volume and scale in which they exist now. This extravagance is increasingly costly. When

Russia opts to preserve these weapons on its land, its leadership is fully aware of what this will cost the taxpayer. The motive behind the Russian leadership's decision is simple: We do not want some kind of maniac like Saddam Husayn brandishing nuclear bombs and demanding that we fulfill certain demands, but I repeat, it is expensive to maintain nuclear weapons. It is also expensive to keep nuclear weapons in permanent combat readiness. Besides which, specialists estimate that any sovereign republic wishing to own nuclear weapons will need between 10 and 15 billion rubles just to produce a modern control system for nuclear complexes—not to mention the huge expense on servicing it. These complexes have to be serviced, otherwise they very soon become awkward nuclear junk which not only loses its function as a weapon but, in addition, becomes extremely dangerous for the environment.

Furthermore, almost the entire USSR nuclear industry is located on RSFSR territory. This means that Russia could supply its own nuclear weapons, so to speak, with raw materials, components, and spare parts, but when it comes to other republics this question warrants discussion, as this industry is by no means cheap. Everything that has been said also fully applies to the Black Sea Fleet.

Finally, the idea of destroying nuclear weapons on one's own territory, as advocated by Kravchuk and Nazarbayev, is no less expensive than maintaining this type of weapon.

To summarize all this, it is worth mentioning that when Yeltsin and Khasbulatov say that they are prepared to transfer all nuclear weapons to RSFSR territory, destroy the part they do not need here, and maintain and service the rest (after all, nobody yet intends to completely do away with nuclear weapons as such, and the United States, for example, has not even ruled out nuclear testing: this means we have to do the same), then they know what they are saying, and it is no coincidence that academician Ye. Velikhov opposes the idea of Russia's assuming control over nuclear weapons and is against transferring them to RSFSR territory. Yeltsin and Khasbulatov are doing this in the full understanding that from an economic viewpoint Russia is losing, not gaining, and if the Ukraine and Kazakhstan do not fully understand this, then I suggest that there is no point in trying to explain the benefits to them. Why not let them have the nuclear weapons, and as the question of the Black Sea Fleet is bound to come up, leave it to the Ukraine (if, of course, the fleet itself agrees). Let them manage their own weapons and destroy them, but let them pay for it themselves. Perhaps then the taxpayers in these republic will understand what the rubles (or future hryvny) deducted from their wage packets are being spent on. It remains only to declare unequivocally that, given Kravchuk and Nazarbayev's current position on nuclear weapons, Russia should not spend a single ruble of its taxpayers' money on maintaining nuclear weapons on Ukrainian or Kazakh territory, nor in the matter of their destruction, and in this situation the Russian taxpayer

should be told exactly how much Russia will gain by consenting thus to Ukrainian and Kazakh policy, and what this sum will be used for in our own internal development—that is, how this will affect the lives of each of us, or at least some of our inhabitants.

Russian President Yeltsin Interviewed

*AU21N113991 Hamburg ARD Television Network
in German 2055 GMT 20 Nov 91*

[Interview with President Boris Yeltsin by ARD coordinator Martin Schulze, FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG correspondent Horst Bacia, and ARD correspondent Gerd Ruge in Moscow on the "Im Brennpunkt" program; date not given—recorded; Yeltsin speaks in Russian with simultaneous German translation]

[Excerpts] [Schulze] Mr. President, in a few hours you will be arriving in the Federal Republic on your first visit abroad after the failed coup. We would like to know from you what the Federal Government and the federal chancellor also want to know, namely, what is the situation in the Soviet Union and, above all, in Russia now? [passage omitted]

[Schulze] Mr. Yeltsin, one thing is scary in this connection—the question of who controls the nuclear weapons in the territories of the different republics. Can you give us a reassuring answer? I have even heard that there are people who fear that nuclear weapons might be used against Russia by certain regions, by certain republics. Can you dispel these fears? Are control mechanisms either intact or will they be developed in a way that the dangers can be ruled out?

[Yeltsin] As far as your question as to whether other republics or Russia might use nuclear weapons is concerned—this is not a serious question. This is technically impossible. One center is responsible for the administration today. There is the president of the country, and there is the defense minister. Without these two officials, no button can be pressed. It is impossible. In addition, the president of the country must speak with us before he makes a decision. We have telephone contact, and we can reach each other very quickly to agree on a joint decision—in the three nuclear republics Russia, Kazakhstan, and the Ukraine, for example. With the consent of the republics, the president and the defense minister make the final decision. Fears are unfounded today that nuclear weapons might get out of control. I have familiarized myself carefully with the situation, and I know that very well.

[Bacia] You once mentioned a right of veto in this connection. Do you still insist on this right of veto? What you have just described is a collective agreement on the use of nuclear weapons.

[Yeltsin] What right of veto?

[Bacia] Relatively shortly after the coup you stated that Russia should be given a right of veto concerning the use of nuclear weapons, which means that it would be possible to forbid the use of nuclear arms if Russia does not agree.

[Yeltsin] I understand. First, our aim is that Russia should become a nuclear-free world power. This is a strategic task and a prospect for the future. Second, because we have this crisis phone and because of the fact that the president of the Russian Federation can oppose the use of nuclear weapons, the president of the USSR will not order the use of nuclear arms. [passage omitted]

Nuclear Weapons Alleged Stationed in Estonia

92UN0535F Tallinn RAHVA HAAL in Estonian,
22 Nov 91 p 1

[Article by Jüri Liim: "Taaratown's Nuclear Power"]

[Text] When I disclosed the secrets of Paldiski, I also mentioned briefly that there are nuclear bombs near Tartu. It seemed to me that this information was not taken seriously. Apparently it is not believed because Soviet marshals keep asserting: There are no nuclear weapons in the Baltic area. The same way they recently denied the existence of the reactors in Paldiski. It is too bad that the promises and fairy-tales of the Soviet general staff are still taken for truth, and that these men are being believed. They are believed, primarily, because the agreement with the United States has one item that reads: Atomic weaponry is to be removed from the Baltics. Yes, from time to time, demands have been made on high enough levels to declare the Baltic area free of nuclear weapons, but there has been no detailed review of the situation.

Residents of the Tartu area have been exposed to a lot of grief and psychological stress by the noise, low flying and bustling about caused by the winged killing-machines based on the outskirts of Taaratown [ancient name of Tartu].

Two different kinds of them are located there: Long distance TU-22 bombers and IL-76M transport planes. There are 15 of the first, and 25 to 30 of the other, depending on the situation.

Seven people make up the crew of a transport plane dealing primarily with the hauling of airborne troops. Each load can take 120 soldiers and, depending on need, two armored vehicles or one tank. These could be taken to Europe, or even further.

When speed is of essence, heavy technology is thrown out of the plane with parachutes, the same way the airborne troops are. Not too long ago, in order to gain time, tanks were tossed out along with the crew. However, 90 percent of the time such tossing resulted in reducing the technology into scrap metal and, just as frequently, crippling or killing the crew members.

Despite generous awards, the number of those volunteering to sit in a falling tank kept dwindling. Thus the experiments for "speedy battle arrivals" were suspended.

There is another "trick to fool the enemy" that has become very fashionable lately. Namely, the army transport planes are painted in the colors of Aeroflot. This way, it would seem we are no longer dealing with military planes, but rather with a peace-oriented "safe, useful and convenient" civilian air force. In Tartu you can see the same thing. This would be like painting a red cross on the tank and passing it off for an ambulance.

The TU-22 bomber takes a 5-meter long winged rocket with a nuclear head under each wing, and two magazines in the container, each holding two relatively small tactical nuclear bombs. Thus, there are four of the latter in each plane. All "readiness" maintenance, and release and flight controls are naturally in the hands of the four-member crew.

As I have said before, the chief combat task of the Tartu bombers, in the case of war, is to deliver a blow to the straits of Denmark, and to the objects and settlements there. The Yuryev [Russian name of Tartu] aces will be assisted in their endeavor by their comrades-in-arms from Pskov and St. Petersburg.

Naturally, Tartu's fliers are making their practice flights with training rockets and bombs, i.e. they learn to balance the load on the plane. Their battle drops, however, are done with regular combat bombs.

Well-trained eagles fly with the aforementioned atomic load. Two TU-22 bombers thus armed are on air duty at all times, flying over Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Belorus, also skirting Russia. After that they return to their base location. Sometimes these flights take them out further. Tartu has such patrol duty for 24 hours, and is then relieved by the aforementioned airfields near Pskov and St. Petersburg, until it is Tartu's turn again. Of course, there are also exceptional cases, where one unit or another must make longer flights. I would like to mention in passing that bombing raids to Afghanistan, in their day, were made successfully out of Tartu. This was a significant polygon for purposes of enhancing the combat training of the men. This way, our university town has also made its contribution to the international effort.

I have been asked if there is a nuclear arsenal in Tartu. I can say that it is right on the airfield. The preliminary information received has been confirmed by more detailed data. Also, I have kept my silence up until now, because I had to document the object.

The arsenal is located in three underground hangars, where nuclear warheads and bombs for winged rockets are kept in separate rooms. Both kinds of "merchandise" are encased in lead and packed separately. Of course, the rooms are also furnished/secured accordingly. To my knowledge, there is an arsenal of close to 300 units.

There are only five officers who have access to the arsenal. In addition to these, there is a transport brigade consisting of 30 people, who take the units to the planes in special cars, and load the magazines. The warheads are placed on the winged rockets by specialists.

Located in the same area are the combat units for the winged rockets. Part of them, for lack of space, are camped outside under the tarpaulin, along with the training ammunition.

The whole complex is under special guard and surrounded by its own security fence, in addition to the barbed wire of the airfield. The place is guarded day and night but, somebody with enough patience can find out more, by taking advantage of the moment. Actually, I would not recommend it, because it could lead to shooting.

I also measured the radiation level, which was within the norm, as it was near the reactor buildings at Paldiski. This is due to safety measures mentioned earlier.

Kazakh President Stresses Joint Control of Arms

*OW2511222691 Moscow INTERFAX in English
2032 GMT 25 Nov 91*

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] President of Kazakhstan Nursultan Nazarbayev has reiterated that control over nuclear forces must be exercised by all members of the new Union. Mr. Nazarbayev has made such a statement in response to reports about his intention to pull nuclear armaments over to the Islamic world. " [no opening quotation marks received]

The statement, circulated by the press service of the Kazakhstan president, also says that only dilettantes could speak about the possibility of moving nuclear weapons to Russia. "Each launching system encompasses an underground complex," the statement says. "To move it to another place is just impossible. In the most modest estimate, such a project might cost from 25 to 30 billion roubles."

Mr. Nazarbayev said that the nuclear testing ground in Semipalatinsk would be turned into a research centre which will serve the interests of science and economy. No more nuclear tests will be run on it, however. Since 1949 about 500 nuclear tests have been carried out in Kazakhstan. Until the 1960s nuclear tests had been run in the open. "The Kazakh people have gone through hundreds of tragedies similar to that in Hiroshima," said Mr. Nazarbayev. "Therefore the closure of the testing ground is the implementation of the people's will."

Gorbachev, Kobets Roles in Nuclear Control

*92P50065A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 26 Nov 91 p 1*

["Postfactum" item: "Who Controls the Nuclear Briefcases?"]

[Text] According to informal information received from Yeltsin's closest associates, Gen Kobets controls only the second step in the use of strategic nuclear weapons, but not what people have taken to calling the "nuclear briefcase" (the set of primary basic commands for the immediate use of nuclear weapons). Gen Kobets, who is in fact in charge of defense matters for Russia, received possession of a set of coded commands [shifrokomandy] after the August events in Moscow. About 80% of the Soviet Union's strategic weapons are based on Russian territory. At the present time, Marshal of Aviation Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov, the USSR defense minister, has no access to a "nuclear briefcase." Thus, control over two of the three "nuclear briefcases" belongs to the USSR president and the chief of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff.

Kravchuk on Ukraine's Nuclear-Free Status

Opposes Moving Arms

*PM2811113991 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
27 Nov 91 Union Edition pp 1, 3*

[Interview with Ukrainian Supreme Soviet Chairman Leonid Makarovich Kravchuk by N. Bodnaruk: "Leonid Kravchuk: Leader Must Submit to People's Choice"]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted]

[Bodnaruk] What is your position on questions of the creation of a single economic area?

[Kravchuk] By single economic area, I mean mutually advantageous trade and cooperation with the other sovereign states. But I do not support the idea of a single market, where absolutely everything is standardized and the same—money, prices... As I see it, a single economic area would involve many markets.

I also support the principle of a single strategic military area, but I have not yet obtained the Supreme Soviet's full support on that either. They cry out: We need an army of 450,000 men! I am categorically against that. I believe that strategic forces should be under unified collective command, with a single Defense Ministry and General Staff. We do not need the nuclear button. We do not intend to elaborate our own military doctrine, strategy, and armaments either. Our involvement will be confined to monitoring what is happening on our own territory. Given that blueprint, the purely Ukrainian forces would number 90,000 men or fewer.

[Bodnaruk] What kind of forces?

[Kravchuk] A national guard, which will be used only in the event of riots and other nonstrategic categories of troops. At present there are 1.3 million servicemen on the territory of the Ukraine. Experts have told me that 90 percent of the numbers are normally accounted for by strategic troops, not by general forces. If our blueprint is implemented, the figure could be restricted to 600,000.

[Bodnaruk] The nuclear weapons situation is very unclear—one minute the Ukraine declares itself a nuclear-free zone, the next minute it lays claim to nuclear weapons...

[Kravchuk] If we are going to be living in a single strategic military area, then let everything remain as it is, otherwise our role will be reduced to nothing—only the area will remain. I am against moving nuclear weapons from territory to territory. We do not intend to strip naked, so to speak, and calmly watch our neighbors build up their arsenals. Nothing of the sort. We are prepared to turn the Ukraine into a nuclear-free state, but this goal can be attained only through a treaty process involving all the states that possess nuclear weapons. [passage omitted]

Joint Control as Interim Measure

LD0212221591 Moscow Radio Rossii Network
in Russian 2006 GMT 2 Dec 91

["Information and Analysis" feature by correspondent Leonid Milyarskiy from Kiev]

[Excerpts] [passage omitted] Answering questions from numerous correspondents, the newly elected president of the reborn Ukrainian state gave greater details on certain aspects of his political course. Leonid Kravchuk confirmed his negative attitude to the Novo-Ogarevo attempts, and reported his wish to meet with leaders of Russia, Belorussia, and other former Soviet republics in the near future to propose to them the creation of a community on different principles. [passage omitted]

As for nuclear weapons, both strategic and tactical, the Ukrainian president favors the complete destruction of them on the territory of Ukraine after talks with all interested states. Until that time, the four nuclear republics—the Ukraine, Russia, Belorussia, and Kazakhstan—in his view, should form a collective body that would take under its control [kontrol] all the nuclear weapons on the territory of the former USSR.

Commentaries on Implications of USSR's Breakup

Experts Discuss Security Problems

OW0812120891 Moscow Central Television First
Program and Orbita Networks in Russian 2330 GMT
16 Nov 91

[Boris Smirnov video report; from the "Serving the Fatherland" program]

[Text] There is nothing unusual in the story you have just seen. [Reference to the preceding item on weapon thefts]

The young soldiers decided to earn some money. In the heated atmosphere in which our society is enveloped, such concepts as duty, conscience, and honor have long melted away. A market is a market, though true, it is our own market. And so, the soldiers decided to treat a submachine gun like a computer. The most surprising thing in this whole story is that not one of them thought about the possibility that the barrel of the stolen submachine gun, sooner or later, could be pointed at them, that their mothers could be in the gun sights. Perhaps the most frightening thing is that such recklessness and irresponsibility exists in our society on every level, including the parliamentary level.

Currently, the Republics are dividing up nuclear weapons. They are dividing them simply, like children at a party dividing an apple pie. The Republics are forgetting, however, that each piece of this pie is dangerous to the whole world. [Video shows Smirnov holding a book entitled, "Where Does the Threat to Peace Come From?"]

In my hand I hold a book, published in 1987, entitled "Where Does the Threat to Peace Come From." Well, where it comes from becomes clear from the initial phrases of this book: The threat to peace comes from the U.S. military machine, from the militaristic course of the U.S. Administration and its efforts to conclude international deals from a position of strength. Nineteen eighty seven, two years before the withdrawal of our forces from Afghanistan. Not quite five years have passed, and now we realize that such books should be written about ourselves. [Video shows night missile launch]

[Begin Dimitriy Olshanskiy, political scientist, video recording] The epicenter of today's problems is the problem of security. The Soviet Union is disintegrating, and naturally, that concept of security that we had, is also disintegrating. Today, there is probably not one person who feels secure. Note the facts in the latest polls. Fifty three percent of citizens of the Soviet Union want to have personal weapons, and 14 percent already have them. That is, the concept that we are protected by something has collapsed. Each one of us is defenseless. And at this point, the very large issue of State security emerges. Unfortunately, this concept of national security is not developed in our consciousness. We taxpayers shell out money which goes to who knows where, and have become accustomed to trusting our autocratic politicians and our generals, who pacify us by saying that all is in order. But, in fact, the problem is extremely serious. There is no USSR, and that means there is no security. And a whole new ball game emerges. The question of security is comprised of two issues—the security of who, and from whom. Today, in the conditions of the disintegration of our country, we must, we are bound, to put the question that, we must ensure our own security ourselves. [end video recording] [Video shows soldiers moving through a tunnel complex and control doors; a crawl announces that filming was done in an underground command post of a Strategic Missile Forces unit]

We have become used to living under the bias that someone is threatening us, and that is why we have always strived for nuclear balance, seriously thinking that this is precisely what will guarantee our security. We deployed the latest rockets, hid them deeper in the ground, and on super modern underwater and air platforms, and raised the level of their combat application. However, the result of this race turned out to be regrettable. Having become a Super Power almost solely by virtue of the availability of a super powerful nuclear potential, we became hostages of this deadly wealth. And although a ray of hope appears to have begun to gleam on the political horizon, the reduction of nuclear danger and the realistic elimination of this danger is, nonetheless, still far off. The number of nuclear warheads would allow the leading nuclear Powers today, to destroy each other at least ten times over. Let us multiply this by the unpredictability of events in our former Union household and it will be clear beyond which brink humanity could find itself.

[Begin Olshanskiy video recording] As has already been publicized, on 18 August, Gorbachev's nuclear control briefcase disappeared from Faros [in the Crimea]. The very same case that has the nuclear codes, which are the key to the nuclear lock. Turn the key, and that would activate the buttons, and the warheads. The nuclear case disappeared along with Gorbachev's nuclear officer, the man who is occasionally called Gorbachev's nuclear subscriber [abonent], and to this day there has not been even one official announcement as to the whereabouts of the officer and the case. [Video shows a missile launch]

[Text] [Olshanskiy continues] We were defenseless for two or three days, yet no one attacked us. That means no one wants to attack us. That means this is a pseudo problem which is specially created by certain circles—the Military Industrial complex, the generals, by certain politicians—to support their power base, to support their supremacy. You know, sometimes I think that there is a very large game going on. For that matter, not only among our politicians of the old CPSU order, I think that this game is peculiar to certain U.S. circles, certain politicians, and certain generals as well. Generals everywhere are generals, whether they are American or Soviet. To receive new stars on their epaulets, it is necessary for them to conduct some kind of testing, represent some kind of activity, speak of how they are ensuring security. For the politicians it is necessary to speak about something a little bit different. It is necessary for them to talk about how we are disarming, what negotiations we are conducting, and so on, and so forth. But notice, that no real reduction is taking place despite many decades of talks, and many signed agreements. [end video recording] [Video shows an officer looking into an empty missile silo, a semitrailer driving off with a tube-like container on its tray, officers throwing what appear to be tennis balls into the silo]

Let us note, however, that reduction is, nonetheless, going on. In the unit where these shots were taken the last rocket was being dismantled. The last one here, in

this unit. Altogether, 503 intercontinental ballistic missiles will be stood down from combat duty in the armed forces, and the number of nuclear weapons will be reduced to 5000. But, however few nuclear weapons remain, there will be still too many nonetheless, and it will constantly pose a danger for humanity.

Moreover, under the terms of reduction, the second generation nuclear weapons, are today, being replaced by the highly-accurate third generation, capable of delivering selected strikes, on separate targets. The temptation to use it could become more probable than before. [Video shows various activities surrounding dismantling of missiles]

[Begin video recording] [unidentified officer] I consider it necessary to reduce the nuclear potential of our country, and to retain only necessary quantities to ensure the security of our State.

[Unidentified correspondent] As a professional specialist, do you think that parity is now being ensured?

[Officer] Yes, parity is being ensured in principle, and that is why we are involved with this work of standing them down from combat duty to ensure parity with the United States. [end video recording]

[Begin Olshanskiy recording] Even if the latest Start Treaty is realised now, which promised a 50 percent reduction, but in fact, it enunciates a figure of 30 to 35 percent, no greater, even if it is fully realized—which will take a year—then we will return to the level of armament that we had in 1982. In fact, that is before the beginning of perestroika. That means that in the past eight years we have accumulated as much as in all the past decades. There you have the result of the so-called new political thinking. That means this is a game in which [words indistinct], a play on the level of words, and if you will pardon me, on the level of deceiving their own people. [end video recording] [Video shows what appears to be a Scud missile being readied for launch, a tunnel entrance, a person taking radiation readings]

The world community is not so much worried by a rocket confrontation, as by the internal instability of nuclear powers. As one of the options of ensuring the safety of Soviet nuclear installations handing them over to international control was being considered at one time. An inconceivable move it would appear, but a necessary one in case of civil disturbances. Today, we have to pay an extremely high price, in fact the highest price—the lives of people, their health, and a ruined environment even for the careless use of the peaceful atom. On our own land, we have become like nuclear plunderers prepared to turn it into a lifeless desert.

[Begin video recording] [Victor Minin, USSR People's Deputy and member of the State Council Security Committee] I see it is already difficult for Russia, Kazakhstan and the Ukraine to reach agreement on the control of the button on nuclear problems. They all want to control, but that is impossible. In order to be able to dictate their

will to each other, and to be able to speak to Europe in a different tone, they all want to leave themselves two or three rockets, just in case, even though declaring themselves nuclear free zones. Ukraine, having declared itself nuclear free, in fact, is not rushing to become a nuclear free zone. I would say the same about Kazakhstan. Ukraine aside, but Kazakhstan? Who can say that Kazakhstan is a politically stable territory? Of course it is not! I cannot see any structures in the Center which really could clearly[changes thought] which have a clear idea of the processes that are going on.

[Text] [Minin continues] The Ministry of Defense, and all the structures connected with it, are all yesterday's structures. They still exist by inertia, and by inertia continue to defend their interests, offering the Republics a reform of the Armed Forces. But it is not a reform, it is a fundamentally new system of security.

[Aleksandr Rahr, senior scientific worker of Radio Liberty Research Institute] And the dissipation of nuclear weapons, not only to the Republics but to other countries, somehow must be slowed. The Republics, pursuing foreign exchange will, if profitable, sell these very same nuclear arsenals to Third World countries. And who will control this process? The control center no longer exists. We know that even the Germans and the French, that is, specific companies in those countries, participated in various business deals with Saddam Husayn. Why could not some establishment in Azerbaijan, not necessarily a government one, the Ukraine also, or someone in Russia, who has left the control of the center, why could they not sell arms to, for example, Iraq, thereby skirting Europe? [end video recording] [Video shows soldiers entering an elevator in the underground command post]

Too many things have been said in recent years about our fervent wish to draw the United States into the nuclear disarmament process. The leaders of the sovereign Republics continually declared their wish to see their States nuclear free. However, the President of Russia was the only one to react positively to the recent American initiatives also directed toward our Republics. The latter only gave diplomatic excuses. It appears that the wish to divide the country's nuclear pie is nonetheless stronger, but for what purpose? This question is being posed by the very people who it is intended to divide—the rocket troops. Today, on the eve of their holiday, they would also like to know about their future. [Video shows a control room, launch control consoles and operators]

[Begin video recording] [correspondent] Now Nazarbayev, Kravchuk, and so on are demanding the right of veto, demanding their buttons, which as you say, if procedures are followed, then the weapons would be unemployable. That is, in principle, it turns out that all these missiles should be destroyed. Because, in practice, they will really not be used if there are buttons in almost every apartment. Soon sovereignty will be declared in Kazan and it will need a button, then Chukotka, and so on.

[Unidentified soldier] I consider that the weapons should only be in the hands of one. As to its employment, that is a different matter. That decision should rest with some kind of Council or something similar. But the issue of employment must be decided [words indistinct] at the required moment one man....[changes thought] not simply because we have nuclear weapons, because they exist overseas, and other regions have them. And if these weapons used there, then the government cannot take three or five days to think whether to retaliate or not, because it will be too late. There must be some operative capability. [end video recording] [Video shows an SS-20 missile, a missile launch, missile dismantling work]

Life itself dictates the need for a single strategic nuclear force management. And attempts to split up the decades-old mechanism of collective security of the Republics in one fell swoop, is to take the concept of democratization to absurdity. Establishing a nuclear button in each of the Supreme Soviets, could lead to a catastrophe.

[Begin Olshanskiy video recording] And not the final thing I want to say is, here is a purely political opportunity which cannot be missed. We must return to Reykjavik, to that Reykjavik at which Gorbachev and Reagan nearly reached agreement for total reduction, on a complete destruction of the nuclear stockpiles. I think that what we need now is not the Helsinki Two, about which diplomats are getting into a lather, but Reykjavik Two. In a situation of disintegration, we must safeguard ourselves, and be thankful to the world if it comes to aid us in this. [end video recording] [Video shows a missile being crushed, and various other equipment]

The outgoing rockets are being replaced by other, more highly- accurate ones. And who are we trying to fool in this situation? Ourselves, as well as the rest of humanity?

[Begin video recording] [Smirnov] Nuclear weapons should be controlled by everyone in Europe, is that right? Should there be general control?

[Rahr] It seems to me, that nuclear weapons will be controlled by those powers that have them, however, disarmament, and some kind of control mechanism will be created.

[Smirnov] A type of council?

[Rahr] Yes, some kind of a council, and a process of integration into a new, common European home should take place. But again, I am speaking about Europeanization of the western Republics, like the Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, and the three Baltic Republics. Let them have their own armies, but they will no longer be subordinate to Moscow, but voluntarily subordinate themselves to some kind of a new European command, which will spring up much quicker than we anticipate today.

[Smirnov] So, this will be a new military political union?

[Rahr] A new military, political, and even economic union.

[Minin] It already exists in practice. It is just up to us now. As soon as we are able to create our collective system of security and merge into a single system of security with Europe, then we can say that this block has been formed. [end video recording]

[Begin video recording] [Olga Pobortseva, an expert from the Committee on Security of the Soviet of the Union] About 16 or 17 years ago, the United States changed, or rather, returned to a system of voluntary armed forces. This occurred in the process of military reforms which were being carried out in the United States at that time. This reform was highly successful. We are now seeing successes which the United States army is having around the world. The most recent justification and reaffirmation of the latter, was the war in the Persian Gulf, which is well known to all of us. Also well known is the huge effect and political capital this war brought the U.S. [Video shows footage from Desert Storm tank operations]

This issue is still vital to us. The thing is that presently the Soviet Union, or what remains of it, the sovereign Republics, if you will, are faced with the very same problem. The problem of reform of the Armed Forces. And everything that the Republics are doing now, or trying to do—and not only the military organs of the sovereign Republics, but also of the central organs—I must say, reminds me of reinventing the wheel.

The Americans are very pragmatic people. In developing their reforms, they proceeded from a great number of considerations, but the essence was man, people, the individual. These are the greatest qualities of a legal, democratic, and a free society, and the building of an effective, combat effective, relatively inexpensive armed forces should be approached from this premise. This is what, I consider, is very valuable to us.

[Smirnov] We have never valued man, but material happiness was holy, but man was nothing. [Video shows Soviet soldiers drilling and U.S. forces on maneuvers]

[Pobortseva] Regretfully, yes. It is not only harmful, it is harmful to the individual. It has a great social and economic effect. The Americans were the first to (?to understand this). And they turned out to be correct. According to the latest data for the 1991 financial year, the quality of personnel, not officers, we are not speaking here of officers, but rank and file, those who enlisted like here, for instance, those serving (?for one year) [sentence as heard]. So, in all branches of the armed services this figure remains close to 100 percent, and in several instances, they put it at 100 percent plus.

[Smirnov] That is practically ideal.

[Pobortseva] That is practically ideal, 100 percent quality. The key to combat effectiveness are the people. It is not weapons that fight wars. And as one of their former Defense Secretaries, one of the creators of the concept of a volunteer army, Melvin Laird said, it is not

computers, it is not weapons, but people who achieve victory, people achieve success. [end video recording]

Nonproliferation Issue Viewed

PM0212105591 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
27 Nov 91 Union Edition p 6

[Vitaliy Kobyshev "Political Observer's Viewpoint" commentary: "Soviet Threat? Yes, But Now Without Quotation Marks"]

[Text] A slight warming has begun in the international situation. Expressions soothing to the ear have come into use—"the end of the cold war," "the disarmament race," "together toward a lasting peace," and so on.

These are not empty slogans. They are all true, but only partly true. In the opinion of specialists, the "disarmament race" concerns obsolete types of weapons, and the latest, "smart" weapons are not being cut; on the contrary, development of them is being stepped up. So, without doubting the readiness and desire primarily of our country—now a Union of Sovereign States—and the United States to move toward a lasting peace, you cannot help wondering: Is the military threat actually receding and can we finally relax a bit and get down to more urgent and expedient matters?

The last thing I would want to do is to alarm my fellow countrymen as they battle against all kinds of difficulties which have now become unbearable. But at the same time it is impermissible for illusions, which, as is well known, give rise to deep disillusionment or else break people's hearts, to lead to a great and irretrievable calamity.

Thirty years ago John Kennedy predicted that by 1970 10 countries and by 1975 possibly 15-20 countries would have the potential to produce nuclear weapons. He was probably exaggerating somewhat, but specialists would probably prefer to state that the exaggeration was slight.

The Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, signed in 1968, has undoubtedly not only played its own beneficial role but continues to play it today. But the truth is that it has not been an insurmountable obstacle to states desperate to possess lethal weapons. For many of them it is not so much a technological as a political and financial problem. This is not an invention on my part: In this world everything or nearly everything is bought and sold. And, despite the desperate efforts, primarily of our country and the United States, to check the process of the spread of nuclear weapons, some people have, without great publicity, sold uranium and other components as well as delivery vehicles, while others have bought them lock, stock, and barrel.

Now about the most dangerous thing, if not the most tragic.

The recent exchange of "courtesies" between Russian and Ukrainian officials—utterly staggering in its unexpected absurdity—about the possibility of delivering

nuclear strikes against each other, irrespective of the question of who was the first to say "but" and whether this "but" was uttered at all seriously, has given rise to at least three exceptionally important new problems.

First. It has become clear that, although the lion's share of nuclear weapons and delivery systems is located on RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] territory, another three republics among the Union members should now be regarded as nuclear states. "A nuclear potential, 20 percent of which is concentrated in the Ukraine, is, apart from everything else, also a great asset and possession for a sovereign state. I would be in no hurry to give it up. But we will see later what to do with it," Ukrainian presidential contender L. Lukyanenko states.

Second. Insufficiently clear and often simply contradictory official statements are prompting many people to ask a legitimate question. In the former Soviet Union is there a reliable mechanism for control over these weapons of mass destruction? In other words, does a single person invested with supreme authority continue to have his finger on the most sinister button?

Let us be frank. Top Soviet leaders' assurances that nothing has changed in this context and therefore there is nothing to fear do not convince everybody. "USSR President Mikhail Gorbachev has lost control of nuclear weapons," the German newspaper BILD AM SONNTAG claims. In an interview with that newspaper CDU defense expert Bernd Wilz, referring to his recent conversations in Moscow, stated that presently in the USSR control by the center over nuclear weapons is possible only on the basis of consultations with the republics' leaderships. Hans Stercken (CDU), chairman of the Bundestag Foreign Affairs Commission, believes that these republics are trying to use the nuclear weapons on their territory as a means of exerting pressure, and also to demonstrate their independence and sovereignty.

You might suppose that Germany's attitude to this problem was especially sensitive. But it emerges that no, Germany is not alone in this. "Leading military and political strategists share the fear of instability in a disintegrating state that has a complement of 27,000 nuclear weapons.... The uncertainty arising should the Soviet Union disintegrate is at least one of the reasons why Britain and France have decided to continue to modernize their nuclear submarines and tactical nuclear weapons. Working out scenarios for action in connection with the new uncertainty is a task that NATO is getting down to solving," ABC Television explains. "The fact that Boris Yeltsin has a black attache case with him day and night is evidence that there are now two fingers on the Soviet nuclear button," London's THE INDEPENDENT reports in turn. The attache case, which a serviceman carries for him, contains nuclear codes, as does Mikhail Gorbachev's similar attache case. Whether both leaders retain the same degree of control over the Soviet nuclear arsenal remains unclear." And although the

Russian president's apparatus denied the INDEPENDENT report, this information flashed around the world. Some people believed the denial and some did not.

Third. The new situation in our country has aroused just as much fear regarding tactical nuclear weapons and so-called "conventional" weapons, some types of which approach nuclear weapons in their killing power. To what extent is this arsenal controlled? Isn't there a danger that both irresponsible, ambitious governments and terrorists, the mafia, and so on will gain access to it? Many people both here and abroad are concerned, not without reason, that what is being introduced on the former USSR's territory is a market mentality which is extremely simple as far as some people are concerned. If everything can be traded and the main thing is profit, then why make money out of weapons?

A very serious situation is developing. I realized just how serious after talking with a man to whom until quite recently you could not gain access.

For 10 years Vladimir Ivanovich Sementsov headed the USSR Ministry of the Economy and Forecasting Export Control Department. A former department. A former ministry. But he himself is far from washed-up, but is a specialist acting with his former energy and possessing unique experience and knowledge. For 10 years the subdivision he headed conscientiously and extremely efficiently saw to it that no raw materials, equipment, or technology needed for creating nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction left the country. "We worked according to a plan and methodology that enabled us to exercise complete control," Vladimir Ivanovich says. "The work went quite smoothly because we knew that nobody except the Ministry of Foreign Trade had the right to export these products. Now that all enterprises have received the right to carry out export-import transactions, the question has arisen of how to organize control to ensure that new technologies associated with the production of weapons of mass destruction do not become the subject of thoughtless, unprincipled trade."

For my part I will note in passing that in the countries which we now customarily call civilized, tough and sometimes draconian state control has been established over such deals. When it is violated (for instance, the recent disclosures concerning deliveries from Germany to Saddam Husayn of components needed to create nuclear weapons), it becomes a subject for judicial investigation.

This April the USSR president issued a decree approving a system of control over the export of raw materials, equipment, and technology used in the creation of weapons, and also of products for peaceful purposes which could be utilized to create nuclear, missile, chemical, and other types of weapons of mass destruction.

It was a necessary and timely decree. The problem with it, as with many other necessary decrees, is that essentially it has remained on paper. For various reasons.

Including the fact that there is nobody to implement it. After the August putsch all control structures vanished into oblivion. Now something like a commission for state export control is being recreated.

Now for the most important thing. If you bear in mind that, not to mince words, a civil war is going on in a number of regions of the former Soviet Union, the problem of "nonproliferation" is just as important for us from the domestic viewpoint as it is in the international context, or even more important. And we are not the only ones gripped by fear. I get no pleasure from saying this, but we now look much more dangerous to the international community than, say, Saddam Husayn. However, the comparison is more emotional than factual. But the crux of the matter is that the processes taking place in our country threaten the peace and security of all mankind. This is when every reason emerged to talk of a Soviet threat. It is rather terrifying that people abroad see this more precisely and clearly than some of our local Bonapartes, who have been blinded by the power they have usurped and their largely illusory television fame.

Of course, it is easier to note all this than to answer the \$64,000 question: What is to be done?

I will not pronounce on things which require a collective answer, moreover an answer that takes into account all features of a rapidly changing life. Regarding the Soviet Union (alias the Union of Sovereign States), it tried to avert the looming tragedy. Unfortunately, much of what had been done was nullified by the aforementioned events that have developed in various regions of the country. You might say: People are losing heart. We have no right to say that, because it is a matter of life and death for both present and future generations.

People have not lost heart. Much is being done. Let us start with the fact that, on the initiative of around two dozen different Soviet organizations united around and inspired by the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs (now the USSR Ministry of External Relations), an association in support of the nonproliferation of various types of weapons, chiefly weapons of mass destruction, has just been set up. A conference-symposium at which preference was given not to incantations but to specific proposals was recently held in Moscow.

Here are some of them.

To bring to the attention of deputies of the USSR and republic Supreme Soviets a fact which is unusual at first glance but an actual fact nonetheless: The problem with the nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction has now come to the very forefront of international affairs.

To discuss the consequences ensuing from this during consideration and ratification of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty.

To propose the start of special hearings in foreign affairs commissions and in other commissions involved in these problems.

On the basis of the Chernobyl experience, to raise the question of the strictest control over nuclear materials.

To tighten export-import controls concerning these materials and also finished products and technology. In this connection to elaborate precise legislation, which we completely lack at the moment. For example, in England publication of the articles of this legislation required a 500-page volume.

On the basis that the International Atomic Energy Agency is concerned with narrower technical problems, to study the idea of setting up a Nonproliferation Committee under the UN Security Council.

Possibly to agree on holding appropriate international inspections on the ex-USSR's territory.

Many other proposals were made. If approved, all of them could become an addition to the Nonproliferation Treaty.

Mankind once again faces a critical challenge. When I think how on earth to cope with the challenge, which threatens everybody equally, I recall the maxim formulated by wise ancient Roman lawyers: "Nobody should profit by another's foolishness."

Location, Fate of Strategic, Tactical Arms

LD0112215191 Moscow Central Television First Program Network in Russian 2110 GMT 29 Nov 91

[Question and answer session with Aleksey Georgiyevich Arbatov, "specialist" on problems of disarmament and nuclear armaments, with studio audience on 29 November; moderated by unidentified correspondent; from the "VID" program—live]

[Excerpts] In our studio today is Aleksey Georgiyevich Arbatov, one of the country's leading specialists on problems of disarmament and nuclear armaments.

[Correspondent] Aleksey Georgiyevich, our first question.

[Woman] What at the present moment is the percentage ratio of nuclear armaments in the republics?

[Arbatov] Well, approximately 75 percent on the territory of Russia, 15 percent on the territory of the Ukraine, about 8 percent on the territory of Kazakhstan, less than that in Belorussia—in the majority of the republics it is 1 percent or less. In some of them there are none at all.

[Man] In which ones specifically are there none at all?

[Arbatov] Well, the information available, including official information, that all nuclear weapons have been withdrawn from the Baltic republics and the same applies to Azerbaijan and Armenia. As far as Georgia

and Moldova are concerned, nobody seems to understand our military people with regard to whether they have been withdrawn or not—there is various conflicting information about that.

[Correspondent] I just love that phrase—the information available—regarding nuclear weapons. Have they been withdrawn from the Baltic region or not?

[Arbatov] They say they have been withdrawn.

[Correspondent] Who says so?

[Arbatov] The Ministry of Defense.

[Woman] Could you answer this: Who currently has the right to issue the order to press the button?

[Arbatov] Well, presently it is the president of the country who has this right, in agreement with the minister of defense and the chief of the general staff. In other words, these three have the key, or, if you like, the button. None of these by himself can press it. They can only do this together, the three of them.

[Woman] Aleksey Georgiyevich, please tell us, how much do nuclear weapons cost every year?

[Arbatov] Well, roughly I would say that it is probably about 40 percent of our military budget. Our military budget last year was 100 billion rubles [R], so that would be R40 billion.

[Correspondent] How much does one missile cost?

[Arbatov] There are many different missiles. If you are talking about an intercontinental strategic missile, then, including its nuclear warheads, it could cost something on the order of R30-40 million. These figures in short reflect only very remotely the real expenditure of labor, resources, and energy which are spent for military purposes. [passage omitted]

[Man] Tell us, please, do any statistics exist about radiation sickness incurred by those who service nuclear missiles?

[Arbatov] No.

[Correspondent] In other words, no one has ever reckoned how many people die from radiation sickness among those people who work with nuclear weapons?

[Arbatov] I believe that in some instances, when new experiments were being carried out, these observations were conducted and they were kept strictly secret, but, on the whole, of course, no record was made of them.

[Man] Aleksey Georgiyevich, Kazakhstan has announced a ban on nuclear tests on its territory. Following the Greenpeace raid on Novaya Zemlya, the protests against tests in this area are also widening. Where is it planned to hold nuclear tests in the future?

[Correspondent] Is it necessary to carry out nuclear tests in general?

[Arbatov] I think that without any threat to our security we need not carry out nuclear tests for a minimum of five or perhaps 10 years. I doubt whether we can halt them altogether for evermore in conditions where other countries are continuing these tests. However, tests are continuing because these mechanisms have been started and it is very difficult to halt them.

[Correspondent] What do you think—will anyone listen to what you are saying right now and halt their nuclear tests after what you have said?

[Arbatov] Well, you know that the Soviet Union has suspended nuclear tests for one year. As to whether a decision will be adopted in the Soviet Union to suspend these tests for a longer period after what I have just said, I am perfectly sure that it will not be.

[Woman] The policy of disarmament has also led to a situation whereby the first people to leave the country are the nuclear physicists. The danger of a drain of our intellectuals in this direction is clear. Is there anything that can be done about this?

[Arbatov] Of course there is. We must create attractive work for those nuclear physicists within the country. If you are telling me that this sphere is no longer so important and that our security is now tied with other questions, I think that they will move over to those spheres if they can be guaranteed decent enough conditions.

[Correspondent] A question about the specialists. Were the fathers of the nuclear bomb, on the whole, in our country? Or did they steal this bomb?

[Arbatov] Of course they were. Nuclear, and especially thermo-nuclear.

[Correspondent] In other words, it was our own invention and we can be proud of it?

[Arbatov] Well, the question of whether we can be proud of the fact that we were the creator of mass destruction weapons is very complex. However, as to whether they were created in our country, that is indeed the case.

[Correspondent] What do you think, will we soon be speaking about a nuclear parity, for example, between Moldova and Kyrgyzstan?

[Arbatov] Between Moldova no, because all nuclear weapons have been withdrawn from there by all accounts. But if they became enemies and they allocated sufficiently large resources for the purposes of military confrontation, then they could at some time, within a certain number of years, create nuclear weapons—one against the other. There is no doubt about that.

[Correspondent] Surely someone can say something precisely about nuclear weapons, where they are, how many there are, and so on?

[Arbatov] Well, as far as strategic armaments are concerned, we can speak with a very great degree of authenticity; as far as tactical nuclear weapons, we have only very obscure statements. The old system is in operation.

[Woman] One bone of contention is the nuclear potential between the republics. At what variant of division [variant razdela] is it possible to stop today?

[Arbatov] I think that it is not possible to stop at any variant of division of nuclear weapons. They cannot be divided—not for technical, not for strategic, and not for political reasons. In the technical aspect there is a very strict system of monitoring and blocking, in other words, even if you physically take nuclear weapons, if you capture them, you cannot blow them up; you can destroy and pollute the surrounding several square meters with the fission material. You will never be able to blow them up. As far as the political aspect is concerned, there is the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, which was signed by the Soviet Union when ours was a unified state. In accordance with this treaty, we do not have the right to pass nuclear weapons on to anyone.

[Man] Will it be possible to speak in any way about the might of our country if control over nuclear weapons is dispersed throughout all the republics?

[Arbatov] Well, as far as might is concerned, our explosive might will remain the same. However, one cannot speak about any kind of true administration and control over nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons are the kind of thing which are either controlled centrally or are not controlled by anyone. I repeat that this question generally should remain on the agenda. I would like to take you back to how this whole problem began; you know, events happen so quickly in our country that we often forget even about what happened six months ago. Well, six months ago, no other than the central government, in the person of its supreme leaders, adopted this stance: no republic should secede from the Soviet Union, otherwise central control over nuclear weapons will collapse. You see? In other words no other than the central leadership was the first to use this nuclear weapons factor as a bugbear to counteract the disintegratory tendencies in the country. Instead of this, from the very outset it was necessary to pose the question in a different way. I would even have used such a strong expression as to irresponsibly use nuclear weapons for domestic political purposes. That is how it was.

[Correspondent] Please tell us, could the center, given this general system of all the nuclear armaments on our territory, explode missiles on any of the free republics, either directly in the silos or on the surface where they are deployed?

[Arbatov] Of course it is possible to blow up the missiles.

[Correspondent] So that means the center virtually acquires a lever by which it can hold several republics

under its subordination and dictate to it its conditions, say, the degree of the explosion of missiles on its territory?

[Arbatov] Hypothetically, yes. Yes, it is possible. But blowing up a missile does not mean blowing up the warhead. There have been accidents where a missile has blown up in a silo—this happened with the Americans—and the warheads did not even explode. They are very durable things, they are designed to withstand huge loads and terrific burning when they enter the atmosphere. It is not easy to blow them up. So a nuclear explosion would not occur simply by blowing up a missile; it may just disintegrate. But we are of course carrying out tests on explosions in Kazakhstan. Or rather, we had been until recently. So any kind of weapon could be exploded.

[Correspondent] No, what I mean is the warhead. Can we carry out a nuclear explosion by sitting here in Moscow and pressing a button and over in Kazakhstan a missile is exploded?

[Arbatov] No, we cannot.

[Correspondent] Do you rule out the possibility that nuclear weapons might become the prey of armed groupings, let us say—I don't know—the (Vukhabiti), Azerbaijani guerillas, or Armenian, whoever you like?

[Arbatov] There have been unconfirmed reports in the press that an attempt to capture a depot with tactical nuclear warheads was undertaken in Azerbaijan. It was repelled. A great number of tactical nuclear weapons could be made unusable simply by dialing a certain code. Such a blocking system exists on the latest ones, so that if a code is incorrectly dialed it is simply switched off, then it is dismantled back at the factory and then reassembled. You see? Others could be taken out under supervision, and others could simply be destroyed. We have accumulated such a quantity which can in no way be justified, and in this sphere, too. So these measures need to be taken but they have not been. Now we are up against problems. Theoretically this could occur, but this does not mean anyone who—I repeat—captures a nuclear projectile, or a bomb, or the warhead of a tactical missile, or a fougasse [landmine], that they can blow it up. No, he will not be able to blow it up.

[Correspondent] Not by himself.

[Arbatov] Not by himself, but dismantling—having, so to speak, died in the process from radiation—dismantling is possible, and using such fissionable material in order to create such a crude very primitive explosive device is also possible if you put in sufficient resources, acquire the specialists, and set up a laboratory, then this can be done.

[Correspondent] Tell us, please, could a professional, a specialist, in domestic conditions with the means at his disposal, assemble an atomic bomb?

[Arbatov] No.

[Correspondent] Never?

[Arbatov] Never.

[Correspondent] Unfortunately the time for today's discussion has come to an end, and we thank today's guest.

[Arbatov] Thank you for your questions. [applause from audience]

Nuclear Weapons Talks With Ukraine Denied

Transfer of Warheads Alleged

*LD0612141291 Moscow TASS International
Service in Russian 1258 GMT 6 Dec 91*

[By TASS correspondent Andrey Naryshkin]

[Text] Moscow, 6 Dec (TASS)—The General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces has no information whatsoever on talks between the Center and the Ukrainian leadership on nuclear arms deployed on its territory. This is what Colonel General Bronislav Omelichev, first deputy chief of the General Staff, told the TASS correspondent. "I do

not think there is a need at all to discuss issues of this kind," he added. The query was addressed to the General Staff following a report in the NEW YORK TIMES of 5 December. It said that USSR central authorities allegedly "started talks with the Ukraine on the issue of transferring control of 4,000 nuclear warheads to that independent state."

Shaposhnikov on Ukraine

*OW0712003891 Moscow INTERFAX in English
0004 GMT 7 Dec 91*

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The USSR Defense Minister Marshal Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov has said that the Ukraine still recognizes common defense space and aerospace borders, as well as the unity of nuclear forces. He believes that more talks on these issues are still possible. The Defense Minister has dismissed reports that President Kravchuk, of the Ukraine, has asked the USSR Defense Ministry for a say in the control of nuclear weapons.

GERMANY

Brandenburg Official on Soviet Troop Withdrawal*AU1612145491 Berlin BERLINER ZEITUNG**in German**11 Dec 91 p 2*

[Interview with Helmut Domke, Brandenburg commissioner for arms conversion and Soviet Forces liaison, by Matthias Krauss; place and date not given: "The Western Group Is Stable—Even Without a Soviet State"]

[Text] [Krauss] The political landslide in the Soviet Union will probably seriously influence the group of Soviet Armed Forces in Germany. Is there a reason for fear?

[Domke] At present, I do not see any reason. The Soviet Defense Ministry has not yet been removed, but there are already indications that the Russian Republic will inherit this responsibility from the Soviet Union. And there is no indication that other republics are contending with it for this right. Apparently, we have been relieved of the compulsion to exchange details on the return of the troops with various governments.

[Krauss] What is the attitude of the command level of the Western Group?

[Domke] The nationality of about 70 percent of the officers is Russian. The generals—at least most of them—led me to understand that they are against "dividing" the armies in Germany. By the way, this must not be equated with conservatism.

[Krauss] But this means that everything remains as it was with the Soviet troops on German territory....

[Domke] Of course, every soldier and every officer is concerned about this. However, it cannot be perceived that the feelings of insecurity and disquiet have reached a degree that jeopardizes discipline. This year, about 250 army members deserted. This is a comparatively small number. The Western Group in itself is more stable than many feared.

[Krauss] Is this calm only due to the enforcement of military discipline?

[Domke] No, a real esprit de corps prevails among the officers and the army members in general. Indications of a split or hostility cannot be discerned. The generals are making vigorous efforts so that the conditions for the withdrawn units are fairly safe. There were only individual protests and blockades in 1991 and they never concerned the withdrawal as such. Demands for living space or the refusal to settle in regions contaminated by radiation were voiced. The retraining of army members for civilian professions, which was initiated with German help, also has a soothing effect.

[Krauss] However, families of officers who spent some years in Germany can hardly be enthusiastic about this withdrawal.

[Domke] It is hard to tell what the professional soldiers are considering. On the one hand, they have to fear that they will be demobilized and, thus, to be downright cast out. Of course, there is also reason to believe that they will form the highly welcome core of new national armed forces. This could go either way.

[Krauss] Has the end of the Soviet Union had an effect on the way in which the army's withdrawal from Germany proceeds?

[Domke] If it has had an effect at all, it accelerated the withdrawal. According to the treaty, 1,100 tanks were supposed to be withdrawn from Brandenburg. In September there were already 1,400. Of 200,000 Soviet citizens, 47,000 left Brandenburg this year. Here it has to be considered that Brandenburg is the last to be vacated. This is done more quickly in Thuringia and Saxony-Anhalt.

The transfer is an enormous logistic achievement. A new agreement with Poland on the opening of transportation routes is not in sight. Instead, the CSFR helped out. Since rail transports were not possible for some time, almost everything was taken away by sea from Wismar, Rostock, and Mukran. At the same time, a redistribution of the destinations is required because of the political upheavals at home. Despite all these difficulties, the Soviet side never challenged the fixed dates. I want to call on us Germans not to accelerate the withdrawal even more. This is directed against the people. Their accommodation at home has often not yet been clarified.

[Krauss] How far have the negotiations on additional German help in the construction of apartments for the families of officers who are moving progressed?

[Domke] The Soviet side presented exaggerated demands for 10.5 billion marks [DM] as compensation for the real estate left behind in Germany. If, according to the treaty, we were to calculate in return the damage done in their positions in Germany, they would probably have to fork over a lot of money. From my point of view, an end can be put to this dispute by an adequate bulk arrangement.

[Krauss] What areas will the withdrawal in Brandenburg focus on next?

[Domke] Next year, the area around Perleberg will be vacated. We also know of the partial withdrawal from Jueterbog.

Defense Minister Says NATO, Bundeswehr Needed

Notes Concern Over Soviet Nuclear Arms

*LD1612155191 Berlin ADN in German 1510 GMT
16 Dec 91*

[Excerpt] Hamburg (ADN)—In the view of Federal Defense Minister Gerhard Stoltenberg (CDU) [Christian Democratic Union], "no new world war" is threatening at present, "but we still need the protection of the alliance and the Bundeswehr as a precaution." This was stated by the politician to BILD newspaper (Tuesday [17 December] edition) with a reference to the "tragedy in Yugoslavia." It showed "that the danger of the misuse of military superiority for waging war continues to exist." This concern also existed as regards the disintegration of the Soviet Union.

The Soviet nuclear weapons were one main topic of discussion in the West and with the political leaders of the new republics, Stoltenberg said, who last week had attended the autumn session of the NATO defense ministers in Brussels. "We hope clear agreements on joint control over the nuclear weapons by the new community of states will emerge." [passage omitted]

Opposes Further Disarmament

*AU1612110491 Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German
16 Dec 91 p 16*

[Text] The Defense Ministry remains loyal to the old way of thinking in terms of confrontation. In a confidential "secret report" approved by Minister Gerhard Stoltenberg the hardliners distance themselves from further plans for disarmament. The paper ("On the Defense Policy Position Concerning the Progress of Conventional Arms Control in and for Europe as of 1992") says that a troop reduction in Europe can be negotiated at the earliest "as soon as the political-structural processes in the Soviet Union and its successor states have become predictable." This is in harmony with a statement by Defense Minister Stoltenberg after the NATO meeting in Brussels last week. There he stated that "unfortunately," a war with conventional weapons "has become possible again in Europe." Therefore, NATO must have "a sufficient and visible military presence" of its combat troops "in the entire area of the alliance."

Soviet Withdrawal Continuing on Schedule

*LD1712142291 Berlin ADN in German 1342 GMT
17 Dec 91*

[Excerpt] Potsdam (ADN)—The Soviet Union will have withdrawn approximately 164,000 men from Germany by the end of the year; 9,000 more than originally planned. According to information from the man commissioned responsible for the withdrawal in Brandenburg, Helmut Domke, the Soviet military is sticking strictly to its agreed withdrawal plan with Germany. Today in Potsdam, Domke said that fears that political

tensions in the collapsing Soviet Union could delay the withdrawal are proved wrong by the figures. [passage omitted]

TURKEY

Former Soviet Republics To Honor Arms Agreements

*TA1812190291 Ankara TRT Television Network
in Turkish 1800 GMT 18 Dec 91*

[Text] Turkey expects the states that have declared their independence from the Soviet Union to fully abide by their obligations stipulated in international agreements on disarmament and the control of nuclear and conventional weapons.

Ambassador Filiz Dincmen, Foreign Ministry spokeswoman, speaking at her weekly news conference expressed the belief that the republics that have gained their independence will honor the supremacy of democracy and law and respect human rights and fundamental freedoms. She added that Turkey is determined to develop its relations with these republics in accordance with the principles of respect for independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, noninterference in domestic affairs, equality, and mutual interests. Dincmen added that when the decision to recognize these republics was made, Turkey acted in the belief that these republics will abide by these principles whether in relations among themselves or with other countries.

In reply to a question on the Yugoslav republics that have declared their independence, Dincmen said that a decision to recognize them would further complicate the situation. She added that the issue of recognizing these republics should be taken up within the framework of a general solution that will secure peace and stability in Yugoslavia.

UNITED KINGDOM

Major Calls Soviet Nuclear Arms Issue Critical

*LD1412075891 London PRESS ASSOCIATION
in English 0709 GMT 14 Dec 91*

[By Teilo Colley]

[Text] Prime Minister John Major has described the future control of Soviet nuclear arms as a "critical" issue. He said plans for a new commonwealth of states under former Soviet Communist control appeared to be gaining ground, adding: "That means we will have to engage in a proper dialogue with them, determine what is going to happen with the control of nuclear weapons." Equally important were future talks on human rights and the separate issue of foreign debt.

Mr Major said: "I'm optimistic about the future of the people of the Soviet Union. What will happen to the Soviet Union in the sense we know it is at this moment unclear."

Gorbachev, his powerbase dismantled under the republics' commonwealth consensus, could step down soon.

Mr. Major welcomed proposals for an extended dialogue on human rights and the debt question. Leading industrialised nations including Britain have agreed to stop up efforts to ensure food aid reaches the Soviet people.

A meeting at the Foreign Office in London attended by officials of the group of seven countries stressed that 11 billion dollars (6.1 billion pounds) of emergency help already promised should be used to prevent hardship. G7 countries want the food and medical supplies to go to Moscow and St. Petersburg in particular.

Yesterday's meeting—called by Britain as the current G7 chairman—was attended by representatives of the International Monetary Fund, World Bank, Organisation for Co-operation and Development, and European Bank for Reconstruction and Development.

International Control of Soviet Nuclear Weapons Viewed

*PM1712114591 London THE GUARDIAN in English
17 Dec 91 p 8*

[John Palmer report: "Soviet Call To Defuse Arms"]

[Excerpt] Brussels—The Soviet government has suggested that the international community might become directly involved in supervising the decommissioning and eventual destruction of the Soviet Union's nuclear weapons.

The proposal was made to the political director at the Foreign Office, Len Appleyard, during talks with Soviet and republican authorities in Moscow last week. Details of the suggestion—made by President Gorbachev's

senior legal adviser—were relayed to a meeting of EC foreign ministers in Brussels yesterday by the Foreign Secretary, Douglas Hurd.

Mr Appleyard was also told that the three Slav republics of Russia, Ukraine, and Byelorussia had agreed to set up a "unified nuclear command" to take control of nuclear weapons and installations on their soil. Such a command "might include an international element."

It is not clear which international organisations the Soviet authorities and the new Commonwealth of Independent States have in mind to advise on the denuclearisation of their defences. The United Nations, the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, and even NATO are all seen as possible candidates, with suitable expertise.

EC foreign ministers gave a generally warm welcome to the emergence of the commonwealth, which is expected to include many of the former Soviet Central Asian republics as well as the three Slav states. But they underlined their concern over future control of nuclear weapons, the future treatment of national minorities, and the stability of national frontiers.

The minister adopted a declaration of principles which would guide them in recognising particular states. These included effective control of national territory by the new government, and accepted international borders.

The Foreign Secretary said that Mr Appleyard's visit to Moscow, Kiev, and Minsk in the past week had been "generally reassuring." In all three capitals the authorities had stressed their desire to ensure firm and unified control of nuclear weapons. The Ukrainian government in particular had said it intended to become a nuclear-free republic.

The foreign ministers agreed to release a further 140 million pounds of surplus EC food to the former Soviet republics as well as 350 million pounds in food credits. The credits will be paid to both the Soviet authorities and a co-ordinating committee run by the individual republics. [passage omitted]

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